Loye E. Martindale, Darwin W. Larson, Carol W. Clay Logan City Municipal Corporation; and the Municipal Council of Logan City v. Mayor Desmond L. Anderson, City Attorney J. Blaine Zollinger, City Auditor And Budget Director Duane A. Beck : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Loye E. Martindale, Darwin W. Larson, Carol W.
Clay Logan City Municipal Corporation; and the
Municipal Council of Logan City v. Mayor
Desmond L. Anderson, City Attorney J. Blaine
Zollinger, City Auditor And Budget Director
Duane A. Beck : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.J. Blaine Zollinger, Calvin L. Rampton, Suzanne M. Dallimore;
Attorneys for Defendant-AppellantsN. George Daines III; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondents
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Martindale v. Anderson, No. 15498 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/928
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
LOYE E. MARTii;DALE, DARWIN W. 
LARSEN, CAROL W. CLAY; LOGAN 
CITY, a Municipal Corporation 
and the MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
OF LOGAN CITY, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
MAYOR DESMOND L. ANDERSON, 
CITY ATTORNEY J. BLAINE 
ZOLLINGER, CITY AUDITOR 
AllD BUDGET DIRECTOR DUANE 
A. BECK 
Defendants and 
Appellants 
Supreme Court No. 15498 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * * * * * 
An Appeal From the Judgment of the First Judicial 
District Court in and for the County of Cache, State of Utah 
* * * * * * * 
DAINES & DAINES 
128 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
Melvin E. Leslie, Esq. 
Steven W. Allred, Esq. 
LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL 
408 Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
J. Blaine Zollinger, Esq. 
City Attorney 
61 West 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Calvin L. Rampton, Esq. 
Suzanne M. Dallimore, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
400 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants 
Councilman Glenn T. Baird 
Councilman Claude J. Burtenshaw 
61 West 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
As Amicus Curiae 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Response to Appellant's Statement of Facts 
Response to Burtenshaw/Baird Statement of Facts 
Response to Legislative General Counsel 
Statement of Facts 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GOVERNING POWERS GIVEN MUNICIPALITIES 
BY TITLE 10 AND OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH ARE VESTED IN THE LOGAN 
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL EXCEPT THOSE POWERS 
SPECIFICALLY GIVEN THE MAYOR 
[Including Response to Appellant 
Point I, Burtenshaw/Baird Points 
I-VI and Legislative Counsel 
Point I-III.] 
I(A). Powers given to a municipality are 
vested in the Municipal Council 
unless expressly delegated to the 
Mayor or another officer 
I(B). Mayor powers described and 
enumerated by Section 10-3-1219 
and elsewhere should be 
narrowly construed 
I(C). Comparable Mayor-Council, Strong 
Mayor and Federal government 
forms do not authorize the 
mayoral powers which the 
Appellant has presumed to exercise 
I(D). Response to Appellant's Point I 
I(E). Response to Burtenshaw/Baird 
Brief--Points I-VI 
I~'). Response to Legislative Council 
Brief--Points I-II 
( i) 
Page 
1 
1 
3 
4 
7 
8 
10 
11 
11 
11 
17 
19 
22 
31 
32 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
APPELLANT MAYOR HAS NO AUTHORITi TO BUY 
SELL OR EXCHANGE MUNICIPAL REAL PROPERTY 
WITHOUT NOTICE TO, OR APPROVAL BY THE 
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
[Including Responses to Appellant 
Point II, Burtenshaw/Baird 
Poi:1ts I-VI.] 
II(A). The trial court does not concern 
itself with "management" of 
municipal real property 
II(B). The Municipal Council possesses 
plenary control over the sale, 
exchange and purchase of municipal 
real property 
II(C). The Municipal Council power to 
specifically approve real 
property transactions cannot 
be delegated . 
II(D). The Municipal Council should 
approve municipal real property 
transactions by resolution and 
transactions should be openly 
and fairly conducted 
II(E). The Municipal Council and previous 
Logan City Corrunissions stand as 
trustees of municipal real property 
II(F). Response to Appellant's Brief--
Point II 
POINT III 
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL IS THE "GOVERNING 
BODY" AS THAT TERM IS USED IN THE 
MUNICIPAL FISCAL PROCEDURES ACT 
[Including Responses to Appellant 
and Burtenshaw/Baird] 
III(A). The Municipal Council must 
authorize interfund and inter-
departmental transfers . 
III(B). The Mayor's sole power as to 
interfund and interdepartmental 
transfers and other appropri-
ation ordinances is the veto 
power 
(ii) 
33 
34 
36 
37 
39 
40 
41 
44 
44 
I 
_... 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III(C). Response to Appellant Points 
I, IV 
POI:JT I',' 
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL MUST APPROVE 
PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS, INNERBLOCK 
DEVELOPMENTS AMD CLUSTER DEVELOPMENTS 
AS SUBDIVISIONS 
[Including Responses to Appellant 
Point III.] 
IV(A). The Municipal Council has plenary 
control over subdivision approval 
IV(B). The municipal power to approve 
subdivisions is non-delegable 
IV(C). Response to Appellant Point III 
POINT V 
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL CAN RETAIN OUTSIDE 
COUNSEL TO REPRESENT ITS OWN INTERESTS 
[Including Response to Appellant 
Point VI. l 
V(A). The Municipal Council may retain 
special counsel 
V(B). Appellant and City Attorney 
Zollinger were disqualified 
and antagonistic to the 
Municipal Council . 
POINT VI 
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL MAY ACT BY ORDINANCE 
OR RESOLUTION, ONLY ORDINANCES BEING 
SUBJECT TO MAYORAL VETO .. 
[Including Response to Burtenshaw/Baird 
Points III, IV, V.] 
VI(A). The Municipal Council may act 
by resolution or ordinance 
VI(B). Only ordinances or appropriation 
ordinances under the Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government 
Act are subject to veto 
VI(C). Resolutions are only appropriate 
for certain matters 
(iii) 
Page 
47 
48 
48 
51 
51 
54 
56 
57 
58 
58 
58 
59 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
VI(D). The three resolutions passed by the 
Municipal Council regarding 
special counsel and litigation 
are effective 
POINT VII 
INDIVIDUAL COUNCILMEMBERS HAVE A FREE 
AND UNLIMITED RIGHT TO MUNICIPAL 
RECORDS 
[Includi.1;; Response to Appellant 
Point V.] 
VII(A). Appellant mistates the facts 
POINT VIII 
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT HEADS MAY TRANSFER 
ONLY UNENCUMBERED OR UNEXPENDED APPROPRI-
ATIONS WITHIN A DEPARTMENT WITHOUT COUNCIL 
APPROVAL, UNENCUMBERED FUNDS BEING THOSE 
FUNDS NOT SET ASIDE FOR BUDGETED LINE 
Pag~ 
61 
63 
ITEMS 67 
[Including Response to Appellant 
Point IV.] 
VIII(A). The general operation of the 
Uniform Municipal Fiscal 
Procedures Act provides 
public and Council inputs 
into budgets and preserves 
Council control over diversion 
of funds from specified line 
items 
VIII(B). The Uniform Municipal Fiscal 
Procedures Act applies directly 
to Log an City 
VIII(C). Appellant's theory would destroy 
the integrity of a participatory 
budget process 
VIII(D). Line items are a definable and 
significant part of the budgetary 
control process 
VIII(E). General law requires specific 
appropriations by legislative 
bodies 
(iv) 
69 
70 
7i 
73 
75 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
A;nerican Fork City v. '\obinson, 292 P2d 249 (Ut.) 
Baker v. Lake City Sewer Dist, 191 P2d 
844 (Wash. 19481 . . 
Burt v. Municipal Council, 176 N.E. 211 (Mass.) 
City of Bowling Green v. B'd of Education, 
27'd SW 2d 726 (Ky. 1975) . 
City of New Britain v. Hancock, 373 A2d 
'd59 (Conn. 1976) 
City of Princeton v. Woodruff, 104 NE2d 
748 (Ind. 1952) . . 
Comley v. B'd of Purchase and Supplies, 
149 A. 410 (Conn. 1930) . 
Crouch v. Commonwealth, 189 SW 698 (Ky. 1916) 
East St. Louis v. Thomas, 102 Ill. 453 
Ireton v. State, 91 N.E. 1131 (Ohio,) 
J and M Realty Co. v. City of Norwalk, 
239 A2d 534 (Conn. 1968) 
Jamoneau v. Local Government B'd, 78 A2d 
-55:rTN"-:-J. 19J1) 
Judson v. Niasara Falls, 124 N.Y.S. 282, 
-- aff' d -91'lTE 1107--
Kalamazoo Municipal Utilities v. Kalamazoo, 
76 NW 2d, 1 (Mich. ) 
Kingsley v. City and County of Denver, 
247 P 2d 805 (Colo. 1952) 
Meeshe v. Bauman, 241 N.W. 550 (Neb.) 
83 A.L.R. 131 
Othello v. Harder, 284 P2d 1097 (Wash. 1954) 
(v) 
Page 
78 
17 
60 
78 
37 
16,17 
16 
17 
17 
57 
58 
15 
37 
56 
60 
74 
58 
16,18 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ricketson v. City of Milwauk~e, 81 NW 364 
(Wisc. 1900) 
Salisbury v. Na;el, 420 S~ ~j 37 (Mo. App.) 
Shannon Water Dist. v. Norris Jrillin~ Co., 
477 P 2d 478 (Colo. 1970) . . 
Shaw v. Common Council of City of 1:! at ::>rt m·m , 
o3 Il'. i 2d 2:)2 (S.D. 1954) 
State v. City of Seattle, 492 p 2d 1078 (Wash. 
State v. O'Connell, 523 p 2d 872 
State v. Moore, 69 N.W. 373 
Stevenson v. Salt Lake City Corp, 
317 P 2d 597 (Ut. 1952) 
(Wash. 1974) 
1971 
Stone v. Salt Lake City, 356 P 2d 631 (Ut. 1960) 
Visone v. Reilly, 194 A 2d 248 (N.J. Super, 1963) 
Wasfell v. Ogden City, 249 P 2d 507 (Ut. 1952) 
Washington Twp v. Hart, 215 P 2d 180 (Wash. 1950) 
Watson v. State, 518 P 2d 931 (Wyo. 1974) 
Wiley v. Seattle, 35 P. 415 (Wash. ]!)93) 
STATUTES 
New Mex. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-10-1 et. ~· 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 40:60-26 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 705.71 et. ~­
Okla Stat. Ann. §§ 962.24 et. seq. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
§§ 10-6-76 et. ~· (repealed) 
10-8-1 
10- 8-2 
(vi) 
18 
17 
16 
77 
17 
76 
56 ,: 
20 
20 
2J 
20 
19 
26, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah 
10-8-8 
10-8-8.1 
§ § 10-9-1 et. ~-
10-9-25 
§ § 10-10-23 et. ~-
10-10-24 
§ § 10-10-33 et. ~-
§ § 10-10-34 et. ~-
10-10-36 
10-10-37 
10-10-43 
10-10-46 
§ § 10-10-52 et. ~-
17-21-8 
57-5-3 
Code Annotated (Supp. 1975) 
[Respondents have occasionally cited the original 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act as 
codified in the Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975). 
All such citations in text are clearly indicated 
by citation as "original Section " The 
Act was slightly amended and thoroughly recodified 
subsequent to the initiation of this Complaint. 
The amendments became effective during the trial 
court's consideration of Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. For a comparison of the two 
see Statement of Facts, infra at 6, 7.] 
10-6-104 (repealed) 
§ 10-6-112 (repealed) 
(vii) 
Page 
52 
11,26,52 
24,52 
49-52 
11, 47 
45 
47,69 
45,46,69 
69 
69 
69' 70 
70 
46 
48-49 
49 
6,11,14,30 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10-6-113 (repealed 7' l ~) lL!) 
10-6-116 (repealed) 2 2 '3,3 ,:.-
Utah Code An'"~t"lted (:SUDD. 1977) 
10-1-104 15 
10- 3-10 l 6,14,21,: 
§ §10-3-701 et. ~· 25,27,);, 
10-3-711 59 
10-3-713 25 
10-3-717 25 '27' 
10- 3- 719 59 
§§10-3-801 et. ~· 27 
10-3-809 15 
10-3-1201 14 
10-3-1204 12,28,3!, 
10-3-1209 6,14,2; 
10- 3-1210 6 ,12,22 
10-3-1212 37 
10-3-1214 13, 25,E 
4 7 '5 8 ';; 
10-3-1217 2 3' 42 ,,:, 
10-3-1219 12-14 
25 '26 
33' 35 
§ l0-:,-12 20 33 
10-3-1221 33 
10-3-1226 32 
\V~~~; 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wash. Code (Rev.) §§ 35A.12 et.~· 
ORDINANCES 
Logan, Utah, Ordinances § 2-1-4 (1976) 
BOOKS 
J. Fordham, Local Government Law (Rev. Ed.) 1975 
TREATISES 
56 American Jurisprudence Second, Municipal 
Corporations, Etc. 
3 
63 
42 
139 
140 
196 
220 
221 
260 
359 
American Jurisprudence Second, 
American Jurisprudence Second, 
Funds §§45, 46 
American Jurisprudence, Public 
Agency §117 
Public 
Funds §42 
2A Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law (1st ed 
62 Corpus Juris Secundum, Municipal Corporations 
153 
543 
43 Corpus Juris, Municipal Corporation (1927) 
28 Cylopedia of Law and Procedure (1909) 
(ix) 
20 
64 
31 
32 
15 
38 
56 
56 
18 
59 
39 
77 
77 
16,18,40, 
59,60 
16 
18 
17 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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---0000000---
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AND BUDGET DIRECTOR DUANE 
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---0000000---
Supreme Court No. 15498 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
---0000000---
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein Respond-
ents, individual members of the Logan Municipal Council, the 
Logan Municipal Council as a body, and the City of Logan sought 
declaratory relief against Mayor Desmond L. Anderson with regard 
to the respective powers of the Council and Mayor under the 
council-mayor optional form of municipal government. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On Respondents initial Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the trial court awarded judgment to Respondent on its first, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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second, and third claims for relief and while makin~ certain 
legal conclusions with l':?;ard to the fo;_irtn, flfth, ei;nt:i, 
and ninth claims for relief reserved certain selected issues 
for an e·,-identiary hearing, T.R. at 2J5; see 1'.R. at 343. 
trial court :c;~·2;;'.:3j ,',pr;=:_::.ant'.:; ;,cc;io;1 tc J:'..::.-.~=s 1::ity 
Blaine Zollinger and Bud~et Officer Duane Beck as Defendant 3 , 
holding that said parties would be bound by any decision, a3 
subordinates of the Mayor. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Appellant and ~~esponde:-1 :: 
stipulated to certain rulings including dismissal of the scv~~-
claim for relief. Pursuant to the evidentiary hearing and as: 
result of memorandums briefing certain legal issues, the trial 
court entered its final declaratory judgment generally granti~ 
judgment to Respondent on all claims for relief, except the 
seventh which had been dismissed by stipulation. T.R. at 459, 
The trial court found generally that the Municioal 
Council possessed the governing powers of the municipality 
except for those powers expressly vested in the Mayor by th2 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. The trial court 
specifically found that the Mayor could not buy, sell, or 
exchange municipal real property or make interfund transfers 
without specific authorization from the Municipal Council. 
Further, that subdivisions, including interblock developments, 
cluster developments, and planned unit developments, required 
Municipal Council approval. In addition, the Court held tha~ 
the Council could retain counsel in regards to the instant 
declaratory action and with respec-;; to a 1uestio·1~u rc:al ·':'J 
transaction. In connection with that ruling the ~rial court 
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delineated the characteristics of resolutions as opposed to 
ordinances, holding that only the latter could be vetoed by 
the Mayor. Ordinances were found to be acts of a general and 
permanent nature, as opposed to resolutions which dealt with 
administrative determinations. The court also found that the 
council had a right of access to all municipal records and could 
obtain copies free of charge. The trial court also found that 
the city administration could not enter into conditional sales 
contracts, they being debt, without Council approval and finally 
that budgetary line items could not be added without Council 
approval. In sum, that the Municipal Council is the municipal 
governing body except as to those certain specific powers which 
are expressly given the Mayor. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Evidently, Appellant concedes large portions of the 
Declaratory Judgment and has determined not to appeal there-
from. Appellant summarizes the partial relief requested from 
this Court as being the determination that "all executive 
power" is vested in the Mayor and that "all legislative power" 
is vested in the Municipal Council. Respondent seeks from 
this Court a reaffirmation of the trial court's ruling that 
allocations of municipal powers are as set forth in the 
Statutes of the State of Utah as modified and amended by the 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. Further, that the 
Mayor's powers and duties are as set forth and enumerated 
specifically in the statute and that the powers not given to 
the Mayor are retained by the body referred to in the original 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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legislation as the "governing body" that bei:ig the i·:unicipal 
Council. 
STATE~E~T OF FACTS 
In 1975, the Utah State Legislat~re adopted the 
Optional Forms of Municipal 3overnment Act. Logan was the Nn: 
Utah municipality to initiate the optional council-mayor form 
in a referendum held in late 1975. When Logan citizens took 
their ballots they read a summary description of this new 
council form on their ballot title: 
BALLOT TITLE 
Shall the Council-Mayor form of Municipal 
Government be adopted by Logan City? Said 
form of governrr.ent provides for the election 
of five (5) councilmen at large and one (1) 
mayor. 
The Council would be the governing body of 
Logan City and its primary functions under 
said form would be to pass ordinances, 
appropriate funds, and review municipal 
administration. 
The Mayor's primary functions would be to 
enforce ordinances, execute policies adopted 
by the Council, appoint officers and depart-
ment heads with the advice and consent of the 
Council, and to exercise control of all 
departments, etc. within the City. 
T.R. at 439 (emphasis added). The council-mayor form 1rns 
narrowly passed. In 1976, Logan inaugurated the council-mayor 
optional form. 
Disputes quickly arose as to the respective division 
of power within the municipality. The Mayor, Appellant herein, 
argued po1:1er was divided by recurrence to definitions or t11 3 
terms "executive" and "legislative." The locus of each power Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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under this view would be determined by whether its nature was 
primarily "executive" or "legislative." Not only did the 
Appellant make such assertions but he proceeded to operate 
Logan City according to his own interpretation. This included 
the sale, purchase and exchange of municipal property without 
notice to, or approval of, the Municipal Council; large scale 
interfund transfers of Logan City funds again without notice 
to or approval of the Council; unilateral approval of planned 
unit developments, cluster housing and interblock developments; 
refusals to carry out resolutions of the Council; etc. Respond-
ents, on the other hand, maintained that the Municipal Council 
was the residuary locus of the governing powers except as those 
powers had been specifically enumerated as belonging to the 
Mayor. 
When the disputants were unable to satisfactorily 
resolve their differences, respondents initiated the instant 
action for declaratory relief seeking not so much a judgment 
affirming their position as a final and binding legal inter-
pretation of powers. Once initiated, the Respondents determined 
that it was wise to raise not only the issues immediately 
pressing them, but the broader issues existing under this new 
form of municipal government. 
After the instant litigation was initiated the Utah 
State Legislature passed certain laws heralded as a recodifica-
tion of certain municipal laws. The Utah League of Cities and 
Towns of which Appellant is First Vice President, drafted these 
changes. Encompassed within that legislation were certain 
linguistic changes relative to the Optional Forms of Municipal 
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Government Act. Catch phrases such as "executive" and 
"legislative" were inserted where no such words had been 
before along with the following words, ":separate, equal ancJ 
independent branches." Language specifically stating that the 
Municipal Council was the "governing body" was dropped. Hoviev:: 
the changes were caused or initiated, the trial court found tna: 
against the mosaic of the remaining portions of the original 
' 
statute, the linguistic changes had, in fact, caused no subst2:-' 
tive change in the thrust or divisions of powers inherent int'.' 
I 
original legislation. That determination whether it be I 
considered a factual or legal conclusion alleviated the labri~L 
effort of rendering two separate and conflicting judgments with' 
one judgment and broadened the impact and applicability of the 
trial court's opinion. As such, the trial court's decision 
provides a continuing guide for proper operation of the munic~I 
I 
pality. I 
To assist the Supreme Court in comparin;; the original·, 
statute and its slightly altered and recodified twin, the relei."' 
modifications between the two statutes are set out side by si~ 
1975 Optional Forms Act 
10-6-104. Definitions.--
As used in this act (a) 
"Governing Body" means the 
legislative body of any city 
or town organized under this 
act. 
10-6-112. Council-mayor 
and council manager form 
defined.--The optional form of 
government known as the council-
mayor form vests the government 
of a municipality which adopts 
this form in a mayor and a 
municipal council. The optional 
1977 Modifications 
No corresponding section, b~ 
see §10-3-101, U.C.A. 
(Supp. 1977). 
10-3-1209. Council-m~ 
and cou~cil-mana~er form 
defined.-- The optional for~1 • 
government known as the , 
mayor vests the f;ov,2rnment 0; 
municipality v1hich adorts th> 
form in tvw separate, incle!-''.' 
and equal branches or munic: 
I 
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1975 Optional Forms Act 
form known as the council-manager 
form vests the government of a 
municipality in a council and a 
manager. 
10-6-113. Municipal 
Council deemed governing body--
Powers and duties.--The 
municipal council of a munici-
pality adopting an optional 
form of government provided 
for in this act shall be 
the governing body of that 
municipality and shall pass 
ordinances, appropriate funds, 
review municipal administra-
tion, and perform all duties 
required of them by law. 
1977 Modifications 
government; the executive 
branch consisting o~ a mayor 
and the administrative depart-
me~ts and officers; and the 
legislative branch consisting 
of a municipal council. The 
optional form known as the 
council-manager form vests the 
government of the municipality 
in a municipal council which 
shall be deemed the governing 
body of the municipality and 
a manager appointed by the 
council. 
10-3-1210. Functions of 
the Council.--The Municipal 
Council of a municipality adopt-
ing an optional form of govern-
ment provided for in this part 
shall pass ordinances, appropriate 
funds, review municipal adminis-
tration, and perform all duties 
that may be required of it by 
law. 
Hereafter Respondents cite the original Optional Forms of 
Municipal Government Act by the following form "original Section 
II Because of the pervasive use of Utah laws citation as 
"Section " is used to refer to Utah Code Annotated 1953 
and Supp. 1977. 
Response to Appellant's Statement of Facts: 
With respect to Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
Respondents have several disagreements. First, the issue of 
management of city property was never in dispute and to 
R0spondents' knowledge the first time that issue was ever raised 
was in Appellant's Brief on appeal to this Court. The issue on 
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real property rela;;ed solely ;;o the 
sell, or exchange municipal real property withou;; authority of, 
or even notice to, the Municipal Council. T.R. 441. Sec 0~1. 
Mayor had ~he duty to personally assemble, compile anJ copy 
municipal records. The contention of Respondents was that th 9 
Mayor directed his administrative subordinates to supply infor•:.c-
ti on onl~- through his office and that he then placed con di tion3 
on the Council members' ri~ht to obtain that information. On 
this issue the trial cour;; found conflicting evidence. T.R. 
at 446. 
Response to Burtenshaw/Baird Statement of Facts 
This Brief mingles purported facts throughout its 
arguments. Respondent will attemnt to ide•1'.:if:: the sali:mt 
facts with which it disagrees, identifying the same by page 
numbers in said Brief. 
At page 3: Burtenshaw/Baird s;;ate the "gravel pg 
issue" in their opinion is at the heart of the instant action 
and confuses the issues before the Court. Respondents disagre; 
and note the trial record is devoid of any such indication. 
Such a factual conclusion is unwarranted. 
At cage 8: Burtenshaw/Baird introduce purported 
evidence that the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act 
is the reincarnation of earlier legislc,tion called the "Stro:-.0 ' 
Mayor Form." There is no such evidence in the record and 
Respondents dispute the same. Furthermore, that form of gover 
ment was once proposed for Lo~an and the Logan ci tU-:ens by 
vote rejected the same. In any event, ResponJents qu~stio1 
I 
---
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tl1ro basic premise that the interpretation of that Act would 
vary from the trial court's interpretation of the council-mayor 
form. 
At page 10: Burtenshaw/Baird introduce as though it 
were evidence certain vague theories of political science. 
Respondents dispute the same and the "obvious" conclusions 
arising from such theories. 
At page 12 : Burtenshaw/Baird state "the ,judge's 
acceptance of this complaint . shows his failure to inquire 
about and to understand the nature of this dispute." Whether 
that statement is fact, law or emotional outburst, Respondents 
dispute the same. 
At page 12: Burtenshaw/Baird state that "Basic to the 
theory of the system is that skilled administrators execute a 
policy made by the Council with far more equity and efficiency 
than an untrained council." Respondents urge the Court that 
this statement is unwarranted and based on some inherent 
assumptions about the qualities of individuals who Logan citizens 
will choose to elect. Respondents note Logan citizens in the 
past election chose a businessman, untrained in "public adminis-
tration" as Mayor. Respondents do agree that the Council makes 
policy and the Mayor is to execute that policy. 
At pagesl6-19: Here and throughout their Brief, 
Burtenshaw/Baird question the trial judge's procedures, 
capacity and intentions. Respondents dispute the same. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-11.1_ 
Resnonse to Let;i3lative Gerne>ral Coun:3el Stat,:rnccnt of Ilacs: 
A fact is introduced in the legal argument of this 
Brief even though such fact is YJOt in the record, nor has thers 
been any evidence supporting the 3arne. That purported fact 12 
that the Utah 2tate Lec:i0lature continued a "trend" begun '-'lit~, 
the Strong Mayor For~ of Government. P2rhap3 three legislate~ 
consider this to be the case but that can hardlJ repre~en+; the 
view of the entire legislature and such an assumption about +;r,~ 
legislative process is clearly unsupported by any evidence e:zc;'.· 
the opinion of three legislators. Respondents could contest ~-I 
I 
I 
"trend" only by polling the legislators, cross-examining the 
legislators, etc., all of which would be appropriate at the trL 
level, but inappropriate in this Court. This "fact" surfaces 
again at Pages 9 and 10. 
Respondents question the appropriatness and the 
procedures relative to intr::iducing such a fact into the appella: 
record. More fundamentally, Respondents disagree with that 
factual conclusion urging this Court that the legislature's 
intent is plain on the face of the Optional Forms of Municipal 
Government Act wherein that Act gives the Council policy maki~ 
authority and describes that body as the governing body. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GOVERNING POWERS GIVEH MUNICIPALITIES BY TITLE 
10 AND OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARE VESTED IN THE LOGAN ~UNICIPAL COUNCIL EXCEPT THOSE 
POWERS SPECIFICALLY GIVEN THE ~AYOR. 
[Including Response to Appellant Point I, Burtenshaw-
Baird Points I-VI and Legisl&~ive Counsel Point I-III.] 
Respondents respectfully contend the original Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act and its recodified successor 
are, on their face, clear, specific and unambiguous. This 
clarity is complemented by meshing the Act with existing statutory 
and decisional law of the State of Utah and by recurrence to 
reputable treatises on municipal law and applicable judicial 
decisions in other jurisdictions. 
I(A). Powers given to a municipality are vested in the Municipal 
Council unless expressly delegated to the Mayor or 
another officer. 
The Act itself in original Sections 10-6-104 and 
10-6-113 clearly stated that the Municipal Council was the 
"governing body," to wit: 
The municipal council . shall be the governing 
body of that municipality and shall pass ordinances 
appropriate funds, review municipal administration, 
and perform all duties that may be required of them 
by law. 
Original Section 10-6-113. Apart from the inherent substance 
of the words "governing body," those same words are used 
throughout the Utah statutes as terms of art which describe the 
locus of power within the municipal corporation. See, Sections 
10-10-23 et. ~,; see also Section 10-8-8.1. The Optional Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Forms of Municipal Government Act meshes into t~is existln~ 
state law by its own Section 10-3-1204 which provides in 
relevant part: 
All existing statutes governing municipalities 
shall ~~main applicable excent as provided in 
this act. 
Note also the final clause of Section 10-3-1210 which, after 
having clearly deemed the municipal council "the governing boci:., I 
states that they are to "perform all duties that may be require: 
of it by law." If the intention of that Section wasn't to tie 
the new Act back to existing state law setting out the duties o: 
governing bodies, to what law does the Section refer? 
The universal rule of legislative construction, exp~~ 
unius est exclusio alterius, indicates that when a legislatur" 
expressly enumerates powers given, those powers not given or 
enumerated are considered to be expressly withheld. The Utah 
Legislature carefully and specifically defined in Section 10-}_ 
the powers to be held by the Mayor: 
In the optional form of government known as 
the council-mayor form, the mayor shall be a 
registered voter of the municipality from which 
is he elected and shall be elected for a term of 
four years. The mayor shall be the chief executi~ 
and administrative officer of the municipality. He 
shall have the power and duty to: 
1. Enforce the laws and ordinances of the 
municipality; 
2. Execute the policies adopted by the council; 
3. Appoint and remove administrative assistants, 
including a chief administrative officer, and 
with the advice and consent of the council, 
appoint or remove department heads; and appoint 
or remove all other officers, commissions, 
boards, and committees of the municipality, , 
except as may otherwise be specifically limite~. 
by law. Where state law provides for the appo1n-· 
ment of municipal committees by the governing 
body in the council-mayor form of government, t-. 
mayo; shall appoir.: the members of the committe:;; Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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4. Exercise control of all departments, divisions, 
and bureaus within the municipal government; 
5. Attend all meetings of ~he council with the 
right to take part in all discussions and the 
responsibility to inform the council of the 
condition and needs of the municipality and 
make recommendations and freely give advice to 
the council, except that the mayor shall not 
have the right to vote in council meetings; 
6. Appoint a budget officer for the purpose of 
conforming with the requirements of the uniform 
municipal fiscal procedures act and in all other 
respects fulfill the requirements of that act; 
7. Appoint with the advice and consent of the council 
a qualified person to each of the offices in 
cities of recorder, treasurer, engineer, and 
attorney and, in towns, town treasurer and 
clerk; create any other offices as may be deemed 
necessary for the good government of the munici-
pality, and make appointments to them; and 
regulate and prescribe the powers and duties of 
all other officers of the municipality, except 
as provided by law or by ordinance; 
8. Furnish the municipal council with a report, 
periodically as determined by ordinance, setting 
forth the amounts of all budget appropriations, 
the total disbursements to date from these 
appropriations, and the amounts of indebtedness 
incurred or contracted against each appropriation 
(including disbursements and indebtedness 
incurred and not paid) and the percentage of 
the appropriations encumbered to date, which 
reports shall be made available for public 
inspections; and 
9. Perform such other duties as may be prescribed 
by this part or may be required by ordinance not 
inconsistent with this part. 
Section 10-3-1219 (emphasis added). See also Section 10-3-1214 
with respect to the mayoral veto. Following the accepted rule 
of construction, powers not specifically enumerated therein are 
withheld from that officer. Nowhere in the enumeration of 
Section 10-3-1219 is there any indication or even inference that 
the Mayor is to possess ultimate and exclusive control over the 
property, finances, subdivisions, etc., of a municipality. 
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When the oris;inal Opcional For··:s of ':•w 4 ·:ioal Gover~·-
ment Act was recodified in 197 7, Oric;ina1 Section:' 10-o-1G4 
10-6-113, providing that the lllunicipal CouYJcil ·cias the: 3o·J~r:,~:. 
body, were replaced with the follc~in~: 
Each municipali t'/ shall havl? a ~·overnin:: body 1mic'~ 
shall exercise the lc:gislative and executive poi.vers 
of the municipality unless the municinality is 
organized with separate execu:ive and le~isla~ive 
branches of government. 
Section 10-3-101 (emphasis added). 
The optional form of government kno•:m as the counci:-
mayor form vests the government of a municipality 
which adopts this form in two seoarate, indeoendent 
and equal branches of municipal government; the 
executive branch consistin~ of a mayor and the 
administrative departments and officers; and the 
legislative branch consisting of a municioal councE. 
Section 10-3-1209 (emphasis added). The trial court in perusi.: 
this change recognized that no substantial modification had 
occurred: 
The function::; of the council embodied in this sectic 
[original Section 10-6-113] are retained in Sectio~ 
10-3-1201 of Senate Bill 204, but it does eliminate 
the phrase that the municipal council is the gov·2rn-
ing body. However, the functions and duties of the 
council and the functions and duties of the Mayor 
are not substantially changed and remain basically 
the same. 
Therefore in examining the specific areas of 
conflict the Municipal Council will be treated 
as the governing body related to those duties of 
legislation and other functions provided by law, 
and the power and duties of the mayor shall be 
determined under his authority as the chief 
executive and administrative officer of the 
municipality. As far as indulc;ing in the semantics 
involved in the definition of governing power or 
powers, the Mayor's duties are restricted to 
those enumerated in the legislation. 
T.R. at 440. The trial court recognized that a significant 
portion of authority formerly vo2ted in the ConLmission by 
previous laws had, by the Optional Forms of ~unicipal Gover~ 
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Act been transferred to the Mayor. Tik authority so transferred 
was described in Section 10-3-1219 and included enforcement of 
laws, execution of policies adopted by the Council, appointments, 
control of administrative departments, etc. 
The trial court found it unwarranted to presume that a 
wholesale grant of power was given to the Mayor by the words 
"chief executive and administrative officer of the municipality." 
Appellant's argument to the contrary ignores the fact that in 
other Utah laws the same terms are used in reference to mayors 
of municipalities without any such imnlication. See Section 
10-1-104(2) referring to mayors in all cities as "executives" 
and Section 10-3-809 describing the mayor as the "chief executive 
officer." See State v. City of Seattle, 492 P2d 1078, in 
which the Washington Supreme Court finds such words are used 
loosely without clear legislative intent to force municipal 
actions into rigid classifications. See also J and M Realty 
Co. v. City of Norwalk, 239 A2d 534 (Conn. 1968). The Mayor's 
duties and powers under the Act are clearly defined, no loose 
and simplistic application of some general sense of what 
constitutes executive powers should expand those definitions. 
This interpretation of the Optional Forms of 
Municipal Government Act is buttressed by reputable treatises 
and judicial decisions in other states and Respondents can 
find no reputable contradictory authority. 
It is still the rule [referring to municipal 
governments having mayor-executive and 
municipal council-legislative divisions), 
however, that all powers granted to a 
municipal corporation are vested in the 
council unless expressly delegated to some 
other officer or body. 
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 140. 
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1.'l!ii~2 the e;overni:1,_:~ b0dJ7 of' ,'J ~nu~·iic1_0:_:~-i ::0~·r:·1_,1·etti:i-~ 
is not t112 corpcraticn it3elf, l1ow~o~v·-~ · ·· 
constituted, the council or other governin~ 
body is the gen ;1"al ;i.o;'::nt of th' c0r~~·watio:1 fol· 
all pUr003cS a:td ex~1·ci:;.~s all tne Coroorat>' 
!:2.Q'•vers not express!'/ crimmittcJ by law to 
otner cJaru:; or 0fficero. 
62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporation § 153 at 313 (footnotes ornittc, 
(emphasis added). See also 5385 2t 723-29, e.g. 2A Antieau, 
f'.c_;nicipal Corporation La·" § 22. 0 7 ( h2r2inafter cited as ~, 
In City of Princeton v. Woodruff, 104 NE2d 748, 
(Ind. 1952), the Supreme Court of Indiana approved the princ~~ 
that powers not expressly given by the state legislature to 
another entity are reserved to the cor:mon council: 
In every municipal corporation .. there is 
and necessarily must be an official body or 
board constituted and empo111ered to exercise 
the sovereign powers of government delegated to, 
or vested in the corporation by the state . 
[which is] the legislative body or assembly 
of the municipality. 
104 NE2d at 752. The Washington Supreme Court in Othello v. 
Harder confirmed: 
It is the general rule . . . that the powers 
delegated to a municipal corporation by the 
legislature are vested in tne city or town 
council unless expressly delegated to some 
other office or body 
284 P2d 1099, 1102 (Wash. 1954), see_,~:_:~·· State v. O'Connell, 
523 P2d 872, 889 (Wash. 1974) reaffirming Othello holding. In 
City of New Britain v. Hancoc~, the Connecticut court had 
occasion to apply this principle to real property purchases: 
In tlL absence of a specific charter provision 
gi vine a similar po1ver to otl12r specified 
officials of the city, the court construes 
the charter to vest in the common counci 1 ti1e 
power to purchase the subject land and not to 
vest that power in any other elected or 
appointed officials. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-17-
373 A2d 859, 862 (Conn. 1976). See, e.g., Shaw v. Common 
Council of City of Watertown 63 NW2d 252 (S.D. 1954); Visone 
v. Reilly, 194 A2d 248 (N.J. Super, 1963). Nor is this a new 
rule, but one of long-standing significance. See Crouch v. 
Commonwealth, 189 SW 693, 700-701 (Ky. 1916); Comley v. B'd of 
Purchase and Supplies, 149 A. 410, 413 (Conn. 1930); 43 Corpus 
Juris, Municipal Corporation §§ 238, 240; 28 ~- 317. 
I(B). Mayoral powers described and enumerated by Section 10-3-1219 
and elsewhere should be narrowly construed 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted strictly the 
powers given municipalities and their officers by Utah municipal 
law. In Stevenson v. Salt Lake City Corp., the Court, held: 
That the powers of the city are strictly 
limited to those expressly granted, to those 
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident 
to the powers expressly granted, and to those 
essential to the declared objects and purposes 
of the corporation, is settled law in this state. 
317 P2d 597, 598 (Ut. 1952) (emphasis added). See e.g., 
American Fork City v. Robinson 292 P. 249 (Ut); Wasfell v. 
Ogden City, 249 P2d 507 (Ut. 1952). This well worn principle 
should be followed along with its corollary: 
It is a cardinal principle of municipal law 
that a city has only those powers which are 
expressly granted to it by the legislature or 
constitution, or which are necessarily implied 
from such powers as are granted. A corollary 
is that a city official has only such-powers as 
are expressly granted to the official by the 
legislature, or are necessarily implied from 
those powers which are granted. 
Watson v. State, 518 P2d 931, 933 (Wyo. 1974). Municipal 
officials are limited to those "powers and duties as are con-
firmc:d upon them expressly or by necessary implication." 
l 
j 
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Othello v. Harder, 284 P2d 1099, 1102 (tfash. 1')5'.J). 
The treatises are in accord,holdin~ that municipa: 
officers "have only suc:1 po·H9rs '.lei ar0 specificall.Y r;rar1t':':i. 
37 Am Jur § 260 at 884. The terms used to designate the m2 • 
are not considered to be a substantive grant of power: 
The mayor is the official head of a municipal 
corporation and, as such, is a nunicioal 
officer. He is til.e chief executive officer 
of the municipality . Also, the term 
"mayor or chief executive," is a mere 
description of the office and not of the 
character or extent of the powers confided 
to that office . 
The mayor's functions, as prescribed in the 
charter or other governing law, differ in 
various municipalities, and his powers may 
be legislative, executive, or judicial, 
according to the particular governing law. 
As in the case of municipal officers 
generally the functions and powers 
of the mayor of a city are derived from, and 
depend entirely on, constitutional, statutory, 
or charter provisions and valid ordinances, 
resolutions, or bylaws, passed in accordance 
therewith; and he takes nothing beyond the 
powers expressly conferred or necessarily 
imolied. 
62 C.J.S. § 543 and 998-999 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added);~' 2A Antieau, Supp. at 127. 
Thus as summarized in a hoary old Wisconsin case: 
They [referring to municipal officers] and 
each of them, may proceed step by step within 
their prescribed orbit, and in strict con-
formity with the law that sets them in 
motion. 
Ricketson v. City of Milwaukee, 81 NW 864, 866 (Wisc. 1900). 
Failing this their acts constitute a usurpation of authority 
and result in the application of the ultra vires doctrines. 
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exercise unilaterally the authority of a .. inicipal corporation. 
Not even under the most lenient construction of strong mayor 
municipal government forms, has any mayor pretended to be so 
"strong." 
I ( C). Comparable Mayor-Council, Strong Mayor and Federal 
government forms do not authorize the mayoral powers 
which the Appellant has presumed to exercise. 
A careful reading of Utah's repealed Strong Mayor 
Form of Government, Section 10-6-76 et. ~·, indicates nowhere 
a grant to the "strong mayor" of the kind of authority Appellant 
here asserts. For example, Section 10-6-79 vests the "board 
of commissioners" with power "to pass ordinances, review 
municipal administration and to perform all duties that may be 
required of them by law." This section then clearly removes 
the board from exercising any "administrative or governing 
authority conferred upon the mayor." But nowhere in the Act 
is the mayor conferred authority to incur indebtedness nor 
to transfer monies from one fund to another nor to buy, sell, 
and exchange real property. In similar fashion to the Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act, these powers continue to 
reside in the "corrunission" or "council." 
New Jersey has developed at least fifteen optional 
forms for municipal government in what must be a record for 
one state. Parenthetically, we note the laws and annotated 
cases dealing with this bewildering variety of municipal forms 
9overs six volumes of more than 700 pages each. In that 
infinite variety, there is not one form in which the mayor, 
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manager, chief executive or president wields the power asse"' 
~ v: 
by Appellant herein. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 40:60-26 giving po,. 
of sale of real property to the "governing body" and which 
requires notice and public sale or passage of an ordinance 
and private sale, or resolution and delayed final apr~=~~l w I 
approval by a named state official. A unilateral sale by a 
"chief executive" or other titular head is simply not allowea. i 
I Hew Mexico has what is termed a Mayor-Council form. I 
See New Mex. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-10-1 et.~· In that form the\ 
Council manages the property and the Mayor administers dep~~ 
ments, appoints and enforces ordinances. See New Mexico Stat. 
Ann. § § 14-10-4, 14-10-6, 14-11-3. Oklahoma has what it call' 
a Statutory Strong-Mayor-Council Government. See 11 Okl. St. 
Ann. § 962.1 et. ~· Nowhere in that Oklahoma statute is th~ 
"strong mayor" given authority to deal with real property 
although he very specifically is given authority to purchase 
supplies, equipment and materials subject to regulation by the 
Council. 11 Okl. St. Ann. § 962.24. See, e.g., Wash. Code 
~ § 35A.12 et seq. 
In Ohio, they have an optional form referred to as 
the ''Federal Plan" which sets up an executive-legislative-
judicial model based on the state and federal model. Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 705.71 et.~· In this form all legislatiV' 
power expressly goes to the Council and all executive power 
expressly goes to the Mayor. But even under this clearest 
example of what Appellant tells us the Optional Forms of 
Municipal Government Act is, there is no authority express or 
implied for the Mayor to exercise the type of authority which 
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the Appellant claims. See Section 705.79 setting out specific 
duties of the mayor. Again the Council is the residuary holder 
or locus of power by reason of Section 705.86 which ties that 
"Federal Plan" to existing allocations of state powers, for 
example, to Sections 721.02, 721.03, 721.13, 721.26 requiring 
municipal land to be sold only upon the vote of the Council. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
In fact, Respondents are unable to locate any state 
which under any statute sets up a municipal government wherein 
a mayor or chief executive can do the things Appellant contends. 
Furthermore, Respondents doubt such a system exists. It matters 
little what title is used to describe the functional units, 
forms or plans, the various state legislatures have not seen 
fit as a matter of policy to clothe a single individual with 
this type of unilateral authority. 
The question before this court is simply whether the 
Mayor has power and authofity to do the specific acts complained 
of. Perhaps as an aid to reasoning an inquiry into "executive" 
vs. "legislative" nature may be useful, but where is it so 
clearly indicated that an executive official ha~ these uni-
lateral powers? The model' the Appellant seeks to foist upon 
the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act does not exist 
even in the separation of powers, executive-legislative-
judicial, federalistic system. Even should the Appellant be 
successful in proving to this Court that each and every scrap 
of "administrative" and "executive" function is possessed 
completely and solely by him, there still must be proof that 
the powers he asserts are of that nature. Respondents doubt, 
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that even in the most rigid executive-lezislative del 
the Mayor's power and authority even approaches the power 
asserted by him in Logan City government. 
In conclusion, a careful reading of the Utah 
Forms of Municipal Government Act as modified and recodified 
1977 reveals the true positions of the Council vis-a-vis the 
Mayor. In describing the Council's functions there is a broa.: 
grant of power terminating with the words "and Derforms all 
duties that may be required of it by law." Section 10-3-121J. 1 
To what law does the statute refer? To the general laws of 
! 
Utah giving powers to municipalities. In describing the M~~: 
I 
there is a specific enumeration of nine closely defined powe"s ,i 
I 
terminating with the words "and perform such other duties as:: 
be prescribed by this part or may be required by ordinance mt 
inconsistent with this part. Section 10-3-1219. To 
does the statute refer? "Part" refers solely to the 
I 
what 11 pa:·1 
Optional I 
Forms of Municipal Government Act. The Mayor has no authorit/ 
not specifically granted by the Act. 
I(D). Response to Appellant's Brief - Point I 
( 1) REPLY TO: "Utah's legislature intended the optionsl 
council-mayor form of municipal govern-
ment . . to be patterned after the 
federal and state separate-power models. 
[Appellant's Brief at 8.] 
Respondents do not disagree that the legislature 
intended to separate powers, specifically that general 
administrative and executive duties were to be vested in the 
Mayor and his subordinate officers. However, a mere separat~ 
of powers does not imply or demand that the state or federal Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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model of separation be followed. The question better stated 
is which entity receives which powers? There is noth~~6 
inherent in tne premise of separation of powers that says the 
federal model is mandatory. For example, in a business 
corporation there is also a separation of powers between the 
Board of Directors and the President which separation is not 
based on the federal model. There are good reasons for our 
federalistic national system that are not applicable to Logan 
City. Even were Respondents to concede this point, they deny 
that under that system Appellant would have the authority and 
power he has purported to exercise. 
There are numerous indications from the wording of 
the Act itself that the Respondent's theory of separation was 
not intended by the legislature. For example, Section 10-3-1217 
restricts the Municipal Council from meddling with employees of 
the City, proscribing the members of the council from individually 
seeking 
to influence the acts of the chief executive 
or any other officer, to direct or request 
except in writing, the appointment of any 
person to, or his removal fromoffice; or to 
interfere in any way with the performance 
by such officers of their duties. The council 
and its members shall deal with the administra-
tive affairs of the municipality solely through 
the chief executive and shall not give orders 
to any subordinate of the mayor or manager 
either publicly or privately .. 
Section 10-3-1217 (emphasis added). This Section is necessary 
and appropriate; city employees would be in a difficult position 
if they had to respond to six employers, the Mayor and five 
Council members. But Appellant's contention that the Act 
prohibits the Municipal Council from doing anything other than Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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pure legislative tasks is specifically ne~ated by the 3ection. 
It states that the council "shall deal ·11ith administrative 
affairs solely through the chief executivr; (mayor)." That 
statute is a clear ackno'.vledgment of the ccuncil' s proper role, 
it cannot bypass the mayor and deal directly with depart;ied;; 
heads or employees but it can deal with administrative afL1 i:o:. 
The Section does not prohibit the Municipal Council from 
involvement in any "administrative affairs," rather the Sect::.::. 
acknowledges such a power and describes the proper manner of 
dealing with the specified administrative task--employee 
relations. 
Appellant's assertion is that all "administrative o~ 
executive powers were assigned to the mayor" under Section 
10-3-1219. That assertion is erroneous. Section 10-3-1219 
nowhere gives the mayor unrestricted sway over all things 
"executive" or "administr:ttive" in nature. That Section cleari 
and carefully enumerates a series of nine responsibilities or 
administrative roles. Those enumerated duties are hardly an 
exhaustive list of administrative functions, for example, 
nowhere is it stated that the mayor has authority to buy, 
sell, and exchange real property on his own volition. 
Another example is the series of statutes which 
clearly require administrative or executive action on the part 
of the Municipal Council. See Sections 10-9-1 et. sea., 
clearly requiring the "legislative body" to perform administr"· 
tive and executive tasks in regard to zoning and planning. 
The recodified municipal lesislation specifically 
provides that all legislative powers shall be exercised thro':c 
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ordinances. Section 10-3-701. If Appellant's arguments are 
correct that the Municipal Council has only "legislative" 
powers then it is restricted to exercising all its power 
through ordinances. Yet the original act specifically mentioned 
resolutions were to be passed by the Council. See original 
Section l0-6-116. It is noted specifically that by Section 
10-3-713 resolutions deal with "administrative powers." One 
of the specific examples given by the statute of a proper 
resolution is to regulate the "use and operation of municipal 
property." Section 10-3-717 (4). · 
In summary, it is clear that the Council is expressly 
vested with two distinct and distinguishable "rule making" 
powers. The first type of such "rules" they were to make were 
"ordinances." The second type of "rules" were "policy making" 
rules. Sections 10-3-701 et. ~· The Mayor is given veto 
power over the first (ordinances) coupled with an apparent 
duty to enforce them. Sections 10-3-1214, 10-3-1219(1). 
As to the second type or "policy" rules, the Mayor 
is given neither the power to directly or by veto participate 
in their adoption, but he is given a clear ministerial duty to 
carry them out. Section 10-3-1219. It is this last class of 
express powers given to the Council that Respondents urge is 
the proper realm of council administration by resolution. 
(2) REPLY TO: "This legislation [Chapter 8, Title 10) 
only grants the governmental entity 
the specified power--it says nothing 
about the manner of its exercise. 
[Appellant's Brief at 9-10.) 
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Appellant misreads the statute. A close look at 
Chapter 8, indicates that the initial Section states: 
The boards of commissioners and city councils 
of cities shall have the power to control the 
finances and property of the corporation. 
Section 10-8-1. Subsequent Sections of this Chapter all 
begin with simply the words "they" which is a clear and 
unmistakable reference back to the initial Section. The 
draftsman's original form has been clouded by revisions, 
codifications and annotations but it appears reasonably clear 
that each use of the word "they" refers back to the first sec~'.. 
However, when subsequent Sections were added, the draftsmen 
short-circuited the original form and simply used the word 
"governing body" instead of "they" as was used in the older 
Sections. See Section 10-8-8.1. 
In appears to Respondents that the "governing body" 
form in Section 10-8-8.1 is interchangeable with the "they" 
used in the remainder of the Chapter. Under Respondent's 
interpretation the Municipal Council would have all these powe 
unless they are expressly given the Mayor by the Optional For~ 
of Municipal Government Act. 
Appellant makes much of insignificant linguistic 
forms such as Chapter 8. Are we to presume that the alloca-
tions of municipal power in Logan's form of government are to 
be determined in such a manner? Appellant's methodology and 
conclusions as exhibited in the example presented should be 
contrasted with Respondents' argument that the Logan Municip~ 
Council has those municipal powers not specifically given th 2 
Mayor in Section 10-3-1219. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(3) REPLY TO: "Second it divided this vested govern-
mental power into its executive and 
legislative comoo~ents for the first 
time." [Appellant's Brief at 12.] 
Appellant mistates what occurred. Prior to the 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act there was a division 
of legislative and executive powers but the same persons 
exercised a dual role. See Section 10-3-101 setting up both 
legislative and executive powers in the governing body and then 
separating the same by the manner of their exercise. By Section 
10-3-701 legislative power is to be exercised by ordinance; by 
Section 10-3-717 administrative power is to be exercised by 
resolution; and by Sections 10-3-801 et ~· executive powers 
are exercised through supervision of departments. A clearer 
division cannot be formulated. The Optional Forms of Municipal 
Government Act simply vests the supervision of departments and 
certain limited and enumerated administrative tasks in the mayor. 
(4) REPLY TO: "The 1977 legislature added 'clarifica-
cations '" [Appellant's Brief at 12.] 
Respondent notes that there is no indication whatsoever 
in the record as to the legislatures intentions with respect to 
the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. Respondent was 
prepared at the trial level to deal with this issue by proffer-
ing evidence which would have shown: 
1. The linguistic modifications were not called to the 
legislators attention. There is no legislative history whatso-
ever, and furtherthe changes were regarded as insignificant. 
2. The modifications were actually made unilaterally 
and secretly by Appellant on a rough draft copy after the 
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commencement of the? instant dispu:e pur.c; ua~1t to '1 i.:; po::; i ti):': 
as First Vice President of the 1Jta:1 League of Citios and '~o·:;r"· 
(5) REPLY TO: "In short, where the zeneral municioal 
laws are consistent with the council-
mayor form, tney are to be literally 
applied. Where they are not consistent, 
they are superc0ded and modi'.'ied to th~ 
extent of incompatibilit.J." [Aopellant• 3 
Brief ar; 14.] 
Appellant has it backwards. The Optional Forms of 
Municipal Governments Act specifically states: 
All existing statutes governing municioalities 
shall remain applicable except; as provided in 
this part. 
Section 10-3-1204. Clearly unless an existing general munici:;:_ 
statute is specifically modified it still applies. The Act oc 
its face clearly recognizes this distinction. In Section 
10-3-1219(3) the Optional Forms Act specifically makes referen~ 
to Utah's municipal laws providing for appointment of cori:;1itte'j 
by the governing body and modifies that law by spucifically , 
providing the Mayor shall make all such appointments. Such a 
careful effort to apply and modify existing state law negates 
an interpretation that municipalities were to be cast upon 
definitions to determine powc;rs of the Mayor vis-a-vis the 
Council. 
There is no indication or even inference that 
me~' I 
I 
municipal powers are to be categorized and then divided into 
"executive," "administrative" and "legislative" pid;o;eon holes. 
The awesome nature of such a task vrnuld si!ni)lj oven1helm one. 
For example, the zoning and plannin~ power::; would so~eh~~ hJ\ 
to be categorized. An error in this division would cause t~c 
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city's exercise of these zoning powers to be ultra vires, 
and voidable. Such an uncharted and vaguely defined system 
oased solely on defining "executive" vis-a-vis "legislative" 
would invite litigation, be impossible to control and a very 
3tron~ reason not to adopt any such optional form of government. 
(6) REPLY TO: "The law now specifically provides that 
there is no governing body under the 
council-mayor form of government." 
[Appellant's Brief at 16.J 
Respondent respectfully disagrees. Section 10-3-101 
doesn't indicate there is "no governing body" in council-mayor 
cities, it just states that the governing body in such cities 
does not generally exercise both legislative and executive 
powers. Read in conjunction with Section 10-3-1209, it merely 
indicates that the Council and Mayor together form what was 
previously known as the "governing body," the Mayor having 
those governing powers given him in Section 10-3-1219 and the 
Council having all other governing powers. The changed wording 
is appropriate and correct for some of the powers formerly 
given only to the governing body are now specifically given to 
the Mayor. For example, the power to administer municipal 
employees under the old form of government was vested in the 
"governing body." Under the Optional Forms of Municipal Govern-
ment Act, that power, except for some restrictions, is vested in 
the Mayor. See Section 10-3-1219 (6) and (7). In that sense, 
the Mayor becomes part of what was formerly the "governing body." 
More fundamentally there is a political shallowness 
in this contention by Appellant. The original Optional Forms 
of Municipal Government Act specifically and unequivocally Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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provided that the Municipal Council was the governing body: 
"Governing body" means the le3;islative body of 
any city or town organized under the Act. 
Original Section 10-6-104(2); 
The municipal council of a municipality adopting 
an optional form of government provided for in 
this act shall be the governing body of that 
municipality . 
Original Section 10-6-113. When the citizens of Logan receive', 
their ballots and voted to inaugurate this new system they fc~. 
these words describing the new form of government: 
The council would be the governing body of Logan 
City . The Mayor's primary functions would 
be to enforce ordinances, execute policies adopted 
by the Council . 
T.R. at 346. If merely dropping the linguistic words "governi:: 1 
body" fundamentally changed the entire substance and form of 
this municipal government there rises the question of whether 
Logan's citizens freely chose such a system. 
( 7) REP LY TO : "This Court will have declared that there 
are no options of government available 
to municipalities." [Appellant's Brief 
at 14.] 
Appellant mistates Respondents' position. Respondent: 
view the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act as providi:: 
for centralized administrative control and responsibility in a 
single individual, the Mayor. This system is new in Utah and 
is in wide use in many other states. See Part I(C), supra 
discussing municipal government forms in New Jersey, NeH Mexic:, 
Ohio, etc., where statutes of similar import are in effect. 
Act as interpreted by Respondents provides a realistic, workabl 
alternative to the existing commission form. 
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I(E). Response to Burtenshaw/Baird Brief--Points I-VI 
(1) REPLY TO: "The state legislature intended to create 
. a unique functional arrangement." 
[Burtenshaw/Baird Brief at 5.] 
Respondents note here and generally that Appellants 
and both Amicus Curiae are confusing two separate forms, the one 
being the "federal plan" which is a miniature federal system 
with strict executive and legislative divisions with a second 
form which is generally referred to as the strong mayor or 
managerial form. 
If Burtenshaw/Baird are asserting the "federal plan" 
is new or unique they are incorrect. The "federal plan" munici-
pal form was at one time popular in this country: 
The story of American municipal government in 
the nineteenth century forms a gloomy chapter 
in our national history. In a period of 
great economic development there was enormous 
growth both in number and size of urban 
communities. This was not matched, however, 
by progress in the development of municipal 
government. Municipal organization was strongly 
affected by popular antipathy to concentration 
of authority. There was a tendency to imitate 
the organization of state government, particularly 
in applying the idea of checks and balances. This 
was evident as early as 1789, in the case of 
Philadelphia. The city's charter of that year 
created a bicameral governing body and the mayor 
became an independent executive without member-
ship in either branch of the council .. 
The complicated system thus constructed bred 
irresponsibility, political interference, 
inefficiency and corruption. 
J. Fordham, Local Government Law, at 19-20 (Rev. Ed. 1975). 
In the second stage of development [referring 
to municipal forms], the form of municipal 
government generally adopted was a complete 
copy in miniature of the government of the 
United States or of a state. The mayor was 
merely the chief executive officer with no 
legislative power except that of veto. The 
municipal council, usually a bicameral body, 
was stripped of all executive authority and Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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confined itself to making appropriations of 
the public funds and enacting policy regula-
tions . The wastefulness and corruntion 
to which this system of divided resoonsibility 
led finally brou~ht people to realize that the 
administration of the affairs of a "'reat 
municipality is more nearly analogo~s to the 
conduct of a busin~ci~ than to the government 
of a sovereign state . 
56 Am Jur 2d, 11unicipal Corpor:l'.::ions, etc. 139 at 193-94. 
(emphasis added). 
It is Respondents' argument that the Optional Forms 
of Municipal Government Act was not intended to create a mini-
ature federal government in Logan City. A careful comparison 
of the powers and duties of the elected Mayor and the appointed 
Manager in the Act reveals the Mayor has slightly more latitud2 
but it also reveals the similar nature of their enumerated 
duties and functions. Compare Section 10-3-1219 with Section 
10-3-1226. 
I(D). Response to Legislative Council Brief--Points I-II 
(1) REPL.Y TO: "In . Section 10-3-1219 . . we find 
that the Mayor shall be the chief 
executive and administrative officer. 
By virtue of that declaration, the mayor 
is empowe"0 ed to perform certain administr0• 
tive functions and these functions, in 
accordance with the separation of powers 
doctrine, are to be performed essential~ 
unencumbered by legislative restraint." 
[Legislative Counsel Brief at 11.] 
Respondents agree that the enumerated powers in 
Section 10-3-1219 are not to be encumbered by legislative 
restraint. However, the Brief errs in presuming the mere titB 
"chief executive and administrative officer" ipso facto confer5 
a broad range of other powers. If that is so Hhy is there an 
enumeration in Section 10-3-1219? Furthermore, as previou3 l; 
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noted the only indication which is given that the Mayor has any 
powers other than those enumerated is Part ( 9) of Section 
10-3-1219 which refers only to other powers given "in this part" 
which is a clear reference to the Act itself. These other 
powers in that part would be power to veto, Section 10-3-1214; 
power to appoint a chief administrative officer, Section 10-3-
1220; power to propose an administrative code, Section 10-3-1221; 
power to call meetings, Section 10-3-1212, etc. 
More interesting is to pose the question of why does 
Section 10-3-1219(9) refer to "other powers conferred by this 
part" when other sections of the same Act clearly indicate the 
Mayor is to perform additional duties. There is only one answer 
and that is because Section 10-3-1219 is generally intended to 
be an exclusive and exhaustive list of all powers of the Mayor. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT MAYOR HAS NO AUTHORITY TO BUY, SELL OR EXCHANGE 
MUNICIPAL REAL PROPERTY WITHOUT NOTICE TO, OR APPROVAL BY, THE 
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL. 
[Including Responses to Appellant Point II, Burtenshaw/Baird 
Points I-VI.) 
Respondents urge this Court that Appellant's brief 
mistates and obfuscates the issue before this Court with respect 
to the property issue. The lower court's ruling did not deal 
with "management" of city property nor was that issue ever 
before the lower court. The only issue was the power to buy, 
sell and exchange. Fur~her, the lower court did not enter the 
thicket of describing "executive functiGns," the court simply 
and succinctly held that under Utah muni~ipa: law the Logan 
Municipal Council has authority over the sale, purchase and 
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exchange of municipal real property. The is3ue now before 
this Court on appeal is simply whether the ~ayor under thi 3 
Council-Mayor government form, may buy, sell or exchan~e 
municipal real property without notice, or approval by, the 
Municipal Council. 
II(A). The trial court does not concern itself with "ma;iac:e-
ment" of municipal real property. 
Prior to 1976, Lo~an City conducted its property 
transactions as did other Utah municipalities. The Logan Cit; 
Commission would discuss the relevant property transaction in 
a meeting and pass a resolution to purchase, sell, or exci1ane;e 
the particular property. The Mayor with this authorization 
would then proceed to convey the property by signing a deed on 
behalf of the municipality reciting in the acknowledgment his 
authority given by a resolution of the Logan City Commission. 
Purchases similarly authorized would also be completed by the 
Mayor. 
Upon the implementation of the council-mayor govern-
ment form in Logan pursuant to the Optional Forms of Municipal 
Government Act, Appellant asserted his exclusive right over 
property transactions, alleging it was an "e':ecuti ve function", 
and,as such,his sole prerogative. Most indicative of t~e 
~~rameters of this assertion is the acknowledgment form used 
by Appellant on municipal deeds grgnting property: 
On the 14th day of June A.D. 1976 person~-" 
appeared before me Desmond L. Anderson a: 
Venal Jones who, being by me duly sworn, i 
say that they are the Mayor and City Sec~ er 
res~ ·:ively of the City of Logan and that 
sai 1strument was signed in behalf of sail Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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corporation by authority of Optional Forms 
of Municioal Government Act and the afore-
said officers acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same. 
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Chairman Larsen, T.R. at 42 (emphasis 
added); see also T.R. at 39, paragraph 5. When members of the 
Council objected, the City Attorney affirmed the Mayor's 
position. T.R. at 46. The dispute included not only authority 
to buy, sell, or exchange real property but whether notice had 
to be given the Council. The city Attorney finally did acknow-
ledge that the Council could, by ordinance, require notice be 
given to it of real property transactions. Amidst the continuing 
debate over authority Logan City Ordinance 1-6-6 was passed 
requiring notice be given to the Municipal Council with respect 
to property transactions. T.R. at 213. 
The members of Municipal Council, Respondents herein, 
concurrently requested the City Attorney to seek an opinion from 
the Utah Attorney General's Office with respect to whether an 
additional ordinance requiring Council approval to engage in 
property transactions would be legal. See proposed ordinance, 
T.R. at 214. That request to the Attorney General, dated 
October 12th, 1976, expressed the opinion of the City Attorney 
that such Council control "would completely destroy the form of 
government we have in Logan City." T.R. at 20. The Attorney 
General's Opinion written by Jack L. Crellin, dated November 
4th, 1976, fully supported the Council, concluding: 
It is, therefore, my opinion t~at the Mun~c~pal 
Council can indeed pass an ordinance requiring 
the Mayor to secure the approval of the council 
before either purchasing or selling real 
property and any attempt by the mayor to do 
otherwise would be invalid. 
e. 
- c 
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T.R. at 43-45. That Attorney General's Opinion was cor:imunicat, 
to the Council by the City Attorney along with his letter 
. 
disputing that opinion and Appellant onenly characterized the 
opinion as not being worthy of a first year law student. T.R. 
at 51-53. 
The Mayor then vetoed the proposed ordinance stati~: 
The Municipal Council may not, by ordinance or 
otherwise, confer upon itself administrative 
powers. This ordinance exceeds the limits 
of power granted the Council by that [Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act). It is an 
unlawful and unwarranted intrusion by the 
legislative branch, or Municipal Council, into 
the powers of the executive branch. 
T.R. at 56 (emphasis added); see proposed ordinance, T.R. at 2'.-
Under these circumstances, this legal issue was then 
placed before the trial court in Respondents' second claim for 
relief which sought a determination as to whether the Mayor 
could buy, sell, or exchange real property without notice to, 
or authority from, the Municipal Council. Eventually, the Coor 
granted summary judgment to Respondents holding in its Memo-
randum Decision that control over real estate transactions 
belongs to the Municipal Council. Memorandum Decision, T.R. 
at 301-303; Partial Summary Judgment, T.R. at 348-350; Final 
Summary Judgment, T.R. at 441-42, 448-49. Nothing dealing with 
management was ever before the court. 
II(B). The Municipal Council possesses plenary control over 
the sale, exchange and purchase of municipal real 
property 
Section 10-8-1 specifically vests control of propert, 
of the municipal corporation in "boards of commissioners and c' 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-37-
councils of cities." Section 10-8-2 indicates these same 
entities ''may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, 
and dispose of property, real and personal II The 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act nowhere alters or 
speaks to this allocation of power and responsibility. The 
Mayor's duties enumerated in Section 10-3-1219 do not indicate 
or even imply any power over real property. There is wording 
in the Optional Forms Act itself which implies that the Council 
retains plenary authority over property, for it states "the 
council may hold executive sessions, but only for the purpose 
of discussion of personnel, land acquisitions, or lawsuits. 
Section 10-3-1212 (emphasis added). Of course the direct grant 
of this power is in Section 10-8-1 which power is given to the 
Council by Section 10-3-1204. 
Without belaboring this property issue, Respondents 
note that its discussion of Point I of its Brief, supra, relied 
upon the property issue as a continuing example in its presen-
tation. See particularly Part I(C), supra, dealing with other 
state statutes providing alternate government forms and real 
property control systems therein. 
II(C). The Municipal Council power to specifically approve 
real property transactions cannot be delegated. 
The general rule is that the governing body's power 
to approve real property transactions cannot be delegated to 
others. ~' City of Bowling Green v. B'd of Education, 278 
SW2d 726 (Ky. 1975), Jamoneau v. Local Government B'd, 78 A2d 
553 (N.J. 1951). In determining what particular functions may 
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unless a statute specifically provides oth~r­
wise, legislative and discretionary powers, as 
vested in the governin~ body of a municipality 
cannot be delegated by such a body to the 
administrative officials of the municipality. 
Commonly when the exercise of the discrc::tion 
is involved, the municipal council cannot 
delegate the power of enacting policy re~uia­
tions, of enacting or enforcing building 
regulations, of determinln~ what public 
improvements shall be undertaken, and the 
character and ex~ent of sucn improvements, of 
approving of certain acts, of selling 
municipal bonds, of purchasing fire equipment, 
of entering into contracts generally, or of 
leveeing of tax. 
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 196. The quotation, 
supra, indicates numerous functions considered too discretio~-"' 
to be delegated, for example, it indicates "determining ':1hat 
public improvements shall be undertaken, and the character and 
extent of such improvements." In the matter at hand we do n~: 
discuss mere improvements but the sale, purchase and exchange 
of real property with values of $300,000 and $200,000 each, 
discretionary transations involving the future operation and 
financial stability of a municipality. 
Under the Optional Forms of ilunicipal Government Act 
the Mayor is the chief administrative officer. To presume th2: 
a mere general budgetary allowance, for example, an appropri-
ation of funds for the purchase of park land, is sufficient 
authorization to vest the Mayor with complete authority to 
negotiate, select and purchase specific tracts is an excessive 
interpretation of the vesting of discretionary judgment in f 10 
Mayor. Respondents as a majority of the Municipal Council de:iJ 
any intention to vest or delegate such power in the Mayor. 
I 
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II(D). The Municipal Co~ncil should approve municipal real 
property transactions by resolution and transactions 
should be openly and fairly conducted. 
Transactions involving municipal real property are 
properly authorized by Municipal Council resolution. The agency 
"to sell or otherwise dispose of real estate must be expressly 
authorized. 11 3 Arn Jur 2d, Agency § 117. In Stone v. Salt Lake 
City, 356 P2d 631, (Ut. 1960) this Court held a resolution 
to be proper authorization for the sale of real property in 
contrast with an ordinance. 
An interpretation conferring unilateral authority upon 
the Mayor to buy, sell and exchange real property avoids the 
necessity of a public hearing, notice and a reasonable opportunity 
for those interested to appear and be heard. Vesting one 
individual with the complete and total power to buy, sell 
and trade avoids the critical opportunity for citizenry 
participation and reaction to one of the most important exercises 
of power on the local level. The Appellant has actually pur-
ported to conduct many real estate transactions with no notice 
or participation from even the Municipal Council much less from 
the citizens of Logan. 
In Stone v. Salt Lake City, 356 P2d 631, 638 (Ut. 
1960) this Court indicated the proper manner of conducting 
sales of real property: 
We are entirely in accord with the contention 
that it is desirable and proper that sales 
of such public property be openly and fairly 
conducted. The essential of procedural require-
ments of that character is that there be notice, 
a reasonable opportunity for those interested to 
appear and be heard, and that fairness in the 
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procedure in connection with the sale be 
observed . . its procedure in publicizing 
the proposal, holding a public meeting, 
adopting a resolution . . soliciting 
bids for its sale encompasses the basic 
elements of propriety in dealing with such 
public business. 
The requirements of the Stone case appear entirely appropri~e 
and of equal application to purchases and exchanges of munic0~ 
real property. Antieau comments that, "exchanges are generallJ 
treated like sales as far as the notice provisions are con-
cerned." 2A Antieau § 20.19 at p. 74.10. In the instant matte:-
numerous sales and exchanges have been conducted without any 
resolution, notice or public hearing. For example, the Baugh 
purchase, the Hirschi purchase and the exchange with the L.D.2. 
church on August 24th, 1976. All three of these critic al tram-
actions were entered into without any notice to, or public 
hearing for, the citizens of Logan. The Municipal Council, 
itself, was merely informed after the fact. T.R. at 38. 
II(E). The Municipal Council and previous Logan City Commissio:r 
stand as trustees of municipal real property. 
Antieau comments that "municipal corporations can 
have accountings against officers and employees when the 
municipal authorities believe that governmental properties have 
been misappropriated. 2A Antieau, § 22.10 at p. 249. The 
general rule everywhere is that a public office is a trust and 
a public official is a fiduciary. 
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II(F). Response to Appellant's Brief - Point II 
(1) REPLY TO: "However a determination that Tract A 
should be sold by the city to John Doe 
is not a legislative act; it is an 
executive act." [Appellant's Brief 
at 21.] 
Respondents disagree. The decision in a municipality 
of whether Tract A should or should not be sold is a matter of 
policy. How can the Council adopt a policy of park expansion 
if it can't control which property the Mayor sells? The sale, 
purchase and exchange of municipal real property is at the 
critical nub of policy. Of course, once the city has determined 
as a matter of policy that Tract A should be sold then the Mayor 
would probably be directed to sell it and administratively might 
initiate procedures to implement this policy. It is of little 
import to policy whether John Doe or Richard Roe buys the 
property. Even so, the deed given should properly recite in 
its acknowledgment the authority given, preferably by a specific 
resolution, to the mayor to sell Tract A. 
The critical nature of this policy determination 
becomes even more apparent when purchases are considered. The 
Appellant would have the Court believe it is merely an executive 
act whether Tract A or Tract B is purchased for the city. That 
contention is hardly worth stating. Quite obviously there is 
a critical policy determination involved. 
Unfortunately, these are not abstract considerations 
in the instant case, Appellant actually purchased and sold large 
tracts belonging to Logan City without notice to or authority 
from the Municipal Council. T.R. at 38-40. For example, lands 
were purchased, ostensibly for a new downtown park, at a total 
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cost in excess of ~300,000.00. 
tion involved in the decision to locate a $300,000.00 park 
within three blocks of fou~ other parks and recreational 
developmen+:.s? Appellant would have the ";urt believe that the 
mere appropriation of monies for park purchases is suff~cicnt 
authority for him to unilaterally select and purchase any e;i·19c 
site. 
(2) REPLY TO: Appellant's referendur;i argument, to \·1it: 
That because referendums are sometimes 
required for sales 01 real prooertv in 
other states, such sales are "ad::iinis-
trative" and not "legislative" acts. 
[Appellant's Brief at 22.] 
Appellant's argument is built on sand. Underlying 
this entire argument is the assumption that the Municipal Counc'..1 
I 
is purely a legislative body having no administrative powers. 
Respondents have repeatedly denied that argument, noting in 
conjunction therewith that original Section 10-6-116 express~ 
referred to passage of resolutions by the Council which by 
Section 10-3-717 are for the purpose of exercising administrati:'-1 
acts. For example, Section 10-3-1217 expressly describes the 
mode whereby the Council can deal with certain administrative 
affairs concerning municipal employees. 
The one salient conclusion that Appellant's 
referendum argument does lead to, is that various States have 
been so concerned about the sale of real property that they ha·' 
required municipalities to put it to a public referendum. 
That determination hardly bodes well for Appellant's argume~= 
that he has complete and exclusive authority, unilateral!;, 
to buy, sell and exchange municipal real property. 
I 
~ 
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(3) REPLY TO: "Logan municipal council expressed its 
recognition of the fact that the sale 
and purchase of property is an executive 
functic~ not within the jursidiction of 
the council." [Appellant's Brief at 24.] 
Hardly. Respondents did pass legislation requiring, 
at a minimum, notice. It should be noted that they were given 
questionable legal advice by the City Attorney to the effect 
that any effort to pass an ordinance or obtain legal remedies 
restricting or interfering with the Mayor's exercise of his 
purported "executive right" to unilaterally buy, sell, and 
exchange real property would constitute a violation for which 
they could possibly lose their council seats. T.R. at 51-53, 
82. See Section 10-3-1217 (last sentence). 
What the Respondent Council members did is immediately 
pass legislation requiring notice. The City Attorney having 
informed them this step was permissible. Next the Respondent 
Council members demanded the City Attorney immediately seek a 
written opinion on this issue from the Attorney General's 
Office. See Part II(A), supra, which opinion indicated the 
City Attorney was, in the opinion of that office, wrong. They 
then passed, by majority vote, legislation demanding that the 
Mayor obtain authorization for sales, purchases and exchanges 
of municipal real property. When the Mayor vetoed that 
ordinance, groundwork for the instant action was commenced. 
Respondents do not understand how Appellant is able to gleen 
from these facts or the ordinance in question an admittance by 
Respondents of such authority on the part of the Mayor. 
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POHJT III 
THE MUNICIPAL Cu\JNC IL IS THE 11 WVERIJIIJG BODY 11 AS THAT TEPJ.1 IS 
USED IN THE MUNICIPAL FISCAL PROCEDURES ACT. 
[Including Responses to App2llant and Burtc;,1shaw/Baird, ge:1eral 
-1 
Appellant has not chosen ~c J:'._rsc~l:r appeal the rulir.;j 
of the trial court with respect to the issues raised in this 
Point, Respondents' third claim for relief. However, there are 
rather broad and unspecific attacks by Appellant on the whole 
theory of there even being a governing body. Appellant's Brief, 
at 16. In addition, Appellant urges that all powers should be 
divided into executive and legislative fuctions. Further, 
Appellant's Brief, Point IV, mistates certain issues and calls 
into question determinations made under this Point. The 
Burtenshaw/Baird Brief also levels a general attack at the e~~ 
trial court ruling. Under these circumstances Respondent 
requests a ruling by this Court reaffirming the determination 
of the trial court. 
The critical issues inherent in this third claim for 
relief were decided by the trial court upon Respondents' motion 
for summary judgment. Appellant entered a general denial and 
alleged merely that the practices complained of had been "the 
established practice for a good number of years." T. R. at 126. 
The court held that interfund and inter-departmental transfers 
required approval of the Municipal Council, intr'..'-departmental 
transfers required only the approval of the Mayor and budget 
officer. T.R. at 443-44. 
III(A). The Municipal Council muct authorize interfund and 
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T'.1 • ·;:1 i corm Municipal Fi,~cal Procedures Act, Sections 
10-10-23 et. ~-, establishes 
uniforo and sound fiscal procedures for the 
adoption and administration of budgets ... 
that budgets may be balanced . . . [and] 
specifies the manner in which appropriations 
for various municipal activities are made and 
controls the expenditure thereof . . to 
ensure that executive staffs administer their 
respective functions in accordance with those 
plans, and to permit taxpayers and investors 
to form intelligent opinions based on sufficient 
information as to the financial oolicies and 
administration of the city ' 
Section 10-10-24. The procedures in the Act are at the heart of 
the individual citizen's right to information about, and control 
of, the municipality which governs him; to the accomplishment 
of "this purpose, the provisions of this law shall be broadly 
construed." Section 10-10-24. The Act requires public approval 
by the "governing body" of a "tentative budget," a waiting 
period of "at least ten days," availability of the tentative 
budget for inspection, published notice of a public hearing 
and a "public hearing on the budget . .at which all interested 
persons shall be given the opportunity to be heard" at the 
conclusion of which the budget may be finally adopted. Sections 
lJ-10-34 et. ~-
Quite obviously the careful and meticulous procedures 
of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act would be 
circumvented by the allowance of unpublicized fund transfers 
by municipal officers after the adoption of the final budget. 
This is what has occurred in Logan City; it occurred without 
public notice or hearing to the public. The Municipal Council, 
itself, was never notified nor was its approval sought; the 
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Appellant. T.R. at 72. 
The Fiscal Procedures Act specifically requires that 
the governing body approve transfers causing an increase in t~ 
general fund budget only after notice and a public hearinz, a 
prccedure similar in form to the adoption of the "final 
budget." Compare Sections 10-10-52 et. ~- with Sections 
10-10-34 et. ~· To presume that "the governing body" in the 
Act's usage is not the Municipal Council ignores the express 
language of the Optional Forms of Municipal GovernMent Act a~ 
the tenor and approach of the Uniform f·1unicipal Fiscal Procedrc: 
I 
Act. The result of such a premise is to allow a Mayor complete ' 
freedom to reallocate the budget without any semblance of noti:: 
or public hearing. 
III(B). The Mayor's sole power as to interfund and inter-
departmental transfers and other appropriation 
ordinances is the veto power. 
Section 10-3-1214 of the Optional Forms of Municipal 
Government Act slightly modifies the manner of budgeting 
municipal funds, it allows the Mayor specific veto power. As 
the Mayor is given this power in regard to "appropriation 
ordinances" it is proper to regard him as having the same 
authority as to interfund transfers and interdepartmental 
transfers within the same fund. To allow either the Mayor or 
Municipal Council to obtain some superior leverage or power in 
subsequent alterations of a "final budget" would render nugat-c:' 
their power in regard to the initial adoption of the "final 
budget." l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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III(C). Response to Appellant's Brief -- Point I, IV 
(1) REPLY TO: Argument that all powers should be 
functionally divided. [Appellant's 
Brief at 16-17.] 
Appellant at one point argues there is no governing 
body and that all such usages of the term in former statutes 
require a division of those powers into executive and legislative 
molds. Appellant's Brief at 8-19. Section 10-3-1219 (6) of 
the Optional Forms Act specifically provides: 
Appoint a budget officer for the purpose of con-
forming with the requirements of the uniform 
municipal fiscal procedures act and in all 
other respects fulfill the requirements of 
that act. 
(Emphasis added.) Respondents note initially that a careful 
reading of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act, Section 
10-10-23 et. ~- reveals a constant usage of the term "govern-
ing body" throughout. See,~' Sections 10-10-33, et. ~-
Appellant would presumably have the Court examine each statute 
to pidgeonhole the various executive or legislative functions. 
Respondents urge that by Section 10-3-1214 the Mayor has a 
defined veto right in respect to "appropriation ordinances"; 
that is the power given the Mayor by the Optional Forms of 
Municipal Government Act and that is his limit. 
( 2) REPLY TO: Appellant's Statement of Point IV. 
[Appellant's Brief at 28.J 
Respondents note that Appellant's statement of 
Point IV restates a holding of the trial court. T.R. at 444. 
Respondents do not dispute that holding nor have they ever 
disputed it. However, as to the arguments in Point IV of 
Appellant's Brief, Respondents dispute the same. See 
Respondents' Point VIII, infra. 
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POINT IV 
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL MUST APPROVE PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS 
INNERBLOCK DEVELOPMENTS AND CLUSTER D'.::'!ELOP'tE::r':'s AS STJBDI'!ISirc 
""~' 
[Including Responses to Appellant Point III.] 
In this claim for relief Respondents sought a ruling 
1 
that the approval and filing of a subdivision plat required 
Council approval. T.R. at 6. At the evidenciary hearing the~ 
was a discussion of this issue and Appellant stipulated that 
under Logan's ordinance interblock developments, cluster 
developments and planned unit developments were governed by 
state subdivision law. Transcriot at 118-119; T.R. at 393. M 
the conclusion of that hearing it was agreed this issue would 
be presented to the court in legal memorandums. Transcript I 
at 140-142. Respondent's Memorandum, T. R. at 372. Appellant'' [ 
Memorandum, T.R. at 393. Thus, the issue before this Court I 
is whether Logan City subdivisions must be approved by the 
Logan Municipal Council, it being conceded by Appellant that 
interblock developments, cluster developments and planned u~t 
developments are subdivisions under state law. 
IV(A). The Municipal Council has plenary control over 
subdivision approval. 
There are three fundamental state statutes that 
control. The pertinent parts of Section 17-21-8 provide as 
follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any recorder to record 
any map or plat of a subdivision of land 
situated in any city or town until the same 
shall have been approved by the legislative 
authority of the city or town in which such 
land may be situated . For each and 
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every violation of this section by any recorder, 
his deputies or employees, the recorder shall 
forfeit and pay to the county the sum of $200. 
(Emphasis added.) The pertinent parts of Section 57-5-3 
provide as follows: 
Such map or plat shall be acknowledged by such 
owner before some officer authorized by law to 
take the acknowledgment of conveyances or real 
estate, and certified by the surveyor making 
such plat; if the land is situated in any city 
or incorporated town such plat or map shall be 
approved by its governing body, or by some 
city or town officer for that purpose designated 
by resolution or ordinance of such governing 
body; and, if the land is situated outside of 
any city or incorporated town, shall be approved 
by the board of county commissioners of the 
county, or by some county officer for that 
purpose designated by resolution or ordinance 
of such board. When so acknowledged, certified 
and approved, it shall be filed and recorded in 
the office of the county recorder of the county. 
(Emphasis added.) Section 10-9-25 provides as follows: 
From and after the time when the planning commission 
of any municipality shall have adopted a major 
street plan and shall have certified the same to 
the legislative body, no plat of a subdivision of 
land lying within the municipality shall be filed 
or recorded in the county recorder's office until 
it shall have been submitted to and approved~ 
the said planning commission and legislative body, 
and such approval entered in writing on the plat 
by the secretary of the planning commission and 
clerk of the legislative body, or other designated 
members or employees. No county recorder shall 
file or record a plat of a subdivision without 
such approval, and any county recorder so doing 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. The 
filing or recording of a plat of a subdivision 
without such approval shall be void. In exer-
cising the powers granted to it by the act, the 
planning commission shall prepare regulations 
governing the subdivision of land within the 
municipality. A public hearing thereon shall be 
held by the legislative body, after which the 
legislative body may adopt said regulations for 
the municipality. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The first and second statut::s, supY·::i., aopear with 
the same legislative history going back to revised statutes 
of 1898. The first, Section 17-21-8, is an affirmative rnanda~ 
contained in the law pertaining to County Recorders requiring 
"approval by le.;is la ti ve authority of a city" before recorjine; 
with no delegation mentioned. The second, Section 57-5-3, is 
contained in the Real Estate Plats and Subdivisions Section 
I 
of the Utah Code. It gives the approval power to the "governin;' 
body or some city officer for that purpose designated by 
resolution or ordinance of such govcor;;ing body." 
These first two statutes if taken in their most 
favorable light toward Appellant's position and without con-
sidering the third statute, a later enactment, require the 
specific delegation by resolution or ordinance of the approval 
power of the Council to an officer of the City. 
A reading of the Logan City ordinances interpreted 
by the trial court clearly illuminates (a) the absence of any 
acknowledgment of the authority of the Council under either 
Section 17-21-8 or Section 57-5-3; and, (b) the absence of a~ 
express delegation of the unacknowledged authority; and, (c) 
a complete absence of any awareness or knowledge of the require· 
ments under Sections 17-21-8 and 57-5-3, for recording plats 
in the County Recorder's office. There is no reasonable inte~ 
pretation of the Logan City ordinances tha~ by them,the 
Municipal Council delegates aC<thori ty to the Mayor for approva: 
of the plats as a prerequisite for recording in the County 
Recorder's office. It should be noted that Respondents as a 
majority of the Council have by this action denied 
any claim that they delegated any such authority. 
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IV(B). The municipal power to approve subdivisions is non 
delegable. 
The non-delegability of the Council's power to approve 
subdivisions is clear when viewed in conjunction with the third 
statute, Section 10-9-25, which was enacted in 1945, fifty years 
after the other two enactments. That statute referring to 
cities such as Logan with "Major street plan(s)" affirms that 
in those cities 
[N]o plat of a subdivision of land lying within 
the municipality shall be filed or recorded in 
the county recorder's office until it shall 
have been submitted to and approved by the said 
planning commission and legislative body. 
Section 10-9-25 (emphasis added). 
This provision expressly negates any contention that 
the legislative body could delegate that authority. The 
questions as to interpretation of delegability are then left 
only for resolution as to cities without major street plans. 
That power is clearly non-delegable in Logan City. 
This matter is serious and contemplates consequences 
beyond internal city operations. Section 10-9-25 makes it a 
misdemeanor for the County Recorder to accept and record plats 
not so approved. Why? Because properly approved plats are a 
prerequisite for title to the public who will be buying lots or 
buildings in subdivisions. Non-compliance with that Section 
makes the plat void. 
IV(C). Response to Appellant - Point III 
(1) REPLY TO: "However as the statute specifically uses 
the term 'legislative body' under the 
division of powers doctrine, this power 
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of final approval undoubtedly is 
vested in the council." [.Appellant's 
Brief at 26. J 
Respondents note the mistaken significance which 
Appellant now ties to the mere words "legislati·ve bod:;." Thos~ 
terms like "chief executive" are used not to define functions 
but as a generic name to identify a given governmental entitJ. 
It isn't difficult to recogni:::e t:,c.t the term "legislative bod/ 
was used by the draftsmen to indicate, not function, i.e., as 
opposed to "executive," but the relevant governmental body to 
exercise powers given in the Zoning Chapter, Sections 10-9-1 
et. ~-, further, that "boards of commissioners and city 
councils" were descriptive not functional terms used to descriC: 
that same entity as to general powers. Sections 10-8-1 et. 
~· Indeed a careful look at Chapter 8 will show that there 
is no functional symmetry as to why certain sections begin 
with "they" and thereby refer back to "boards of city 
commissioners and city councils" and others begin by usine; the 
term "governing body." The difference is solely one of age 
and accident, the original statutes use "they," later 
amendments use "governing body." Compare Section 10-8-8 with 
Section 10-8-8.1, the former being enacted in 1898 and the 
latter in 1953. 
Given that Appellant is now willing to recognize tha: 
some of the usages of the terms "legislative body," ":;overnin~ 
body," etc. are devoid of substance and are merely to identify, 
how can Appellant continue to assert that the mere use of tlie 
words "chief administrative officer" and "executive dep2rtment' 
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must be thoroughly substantive to the derogation of all 
established municipal laws and practices. 
(2) REPLY TO: "The trial court, however, held that, as 
the state statute specifically delegates 
to the "legislative body" the authority 
to approve subdivision plats, this 
function cannot be delegated." [Appellant's 
Brief at 27.] 
Appellant's assertion here is that the trial court's 
ruling is based on an erroneous assumption that legislative 
powers are nondelegable. This is hardly a fair characteriza-
tion of the trial court's reasoning. "Legislative body" is 
used as a code word for Council not only in this Section but 
throughout Chapter 9 of Title 10, and such use has nothing to 
do with what nature or kind of power is actually being given. 
The trial court did not discuss nor even consider 
any broad "legislative delegability" doctrines, it simply read 
and followed the obvious import of Section 10-9-25 which 
requires among other things: submission to and approval by 
the legislative body; such approval entered in writing by clerk 
of legislative body; and a public hearing by the legislative 
body. The court didn't have to deal with whether the power 
was "legislative" or not, quite obviously the specific require-
ments of the Section indicated it was not a delegable duty. 
How can any public body delegate a duty when a state statute 
specifically requires that specific body by name to have a 
public hearing, to by name approve the submission and to enter 
such approval by its own named clerk. 
Appellant here again finds substance in words such 
as "legislative body" where there is none. Quite obviously the 
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the U3e of that term in Section 10-9-25 hil3 nothing to do 
with whether the exercised power is "legislative" or "execu~:-.. 
in nature, it is 3imply a name. Appellant doe3n' t ::;eem toge· 
beyond the conception that fellows named Shoemaker and Miller 
must milke shoes and grind wheat. 
POINT V 
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL CAN RETAIN OUTSIDE COUNSEL TO REPRESEITT 
ITS own INTERESTS. 
[Including Responses to Appellant, Point VI.] 
I 
I 
Appellant's Brief urges that this issue is in3epara:_-,l 
from a decision on Point II of its appeal and that a reversal \ 
I 
of the trial court ruling on the buy, sell and exchange proper;. 
issue would necessitate a reversal on thi3 issue as well. 
Respondents deny any such connection. 
The trial court's ruling cites original Section 
10-6-119 and then provides that the Council has "power to 
appropriate money for retention of counsel to represent their 
interests." T. R. at 445. Appellant has chosen to appeal only 
that portion of this ruling as it relates to retention of 
counsel in regard to the real estate question. This same iss~-
retention of counsel, was addressed collaterally in the sixt~ 
claim for relief and to understand the factual context of the 
trial court's ruling the judgment on both claims must be 
combined. The sixth claim for relief dealt with the power of 
the Council to do certain acts by resolution, one of the 
particular resolutions at issue being the retention of counsel 
to investigate and pursue a certain real estate tran3action. 
The trial court found Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-55-
it was stipulated that the appointed City 
Attorn~y is disqualified to represent the 
City in any action related to the Clair 
Bernston prooerty trade ... 
T~2 court holds as to this Sixth Claim for 
Relief that the Council does have the authority 
und2r the circumstances, to retain counsel 
for the purposes designated 
T.R. at 445 (emphasis added.) 
The factual context surrounding this issue was that 
the City Attorney was disqualified by reason of familial 
connections from pursuing the matter and the Mayor was admittedly 
one of the city officials directly implicated in the questioned 
real estate transaction. Under the circumstances the Municipal 
Council felt it had the power to independently appoint outside 
legal counsel. The Mayor and City Attorney vehemently denied 
this power maintaining such an exercise was illegal. T.R. at 
82. The issue presented to the trial court was whether the 
Council could exercise this power "under the circumstances." 
The trial court, limiting its ruling to the circumstances, held 
the Council had such power. 
Respondents urge the Court that pursuant to Section 
10-3-1215 the Council is authorized and given power to effectuate 
its duties. Given what its duties are in respect to investi-
gating municipal administration, Section 10-3-1217, and its 
duty collectively as a trustee of city property, Respondents 
were authorized under the circumstances to retain outside 
counsel. Those specific circumstances being disqualification 
of the acting City Attorney and a conflict of interest in the 
Ma.Jor. 
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V(A). The Municipal Council may retain special counsel. 
It is everywhere agreed, absent specific prohibition 
to the contrary, that 
the legislative or governing body of a 
municipality--such as the city council 
may employ counsel. 
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 221 at p. 281 (footnotes 
omitted). Indeed,even where there is a specific prohibition 
the governing body has been allowed to retain special counsel. 
In Judson v. Niagara Falls it was held that the governing bo~ ' 
could employ special counsel, despite charter prohibitions, 
when the mayor was head of one of the departments being invest~ 
gated and had the power of appointment and removal of the 
regular city attorney. 97NE 1107 (N.Y.) 
The occasion upon which special counsel may be 
retained is not limited. 
[A] municipal corporation having a regular 
salaried city attorney is not for that 
reason prevented from employing special 
counsel in particular situations when the 
city attorney is absent, ill or disqualified; 
nor is such implied power of the municipal 
corporation taken away where subsequent 
enactments create the office of city attorney, 
impose upon him the duty to prosecute or 
defend all actions to which the municipal 
corporation is a party, and provide that for 
duties devolving upon any municipal officer 
compensation shall not be paid to any other 
person . . A municipal! ty may employ special 
counsel where a vacancy exists in the office 
of the city or municipal attorney, or where 
he refuses to act, or where there is a conflict 
between departments or between officers of the 
municipal corporation. 
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 220 at p. 280. ( emphasi' 
added.) For example, in the case of Wiley v. Seattle, the 
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Washin~ton Court held that when a question respecting the 
various powers of respective groups within the municipality 
arose and the municipal council and city attorney were arrayed 
against the mayor, the mayor could employ special counsel on 
behalf of the city. 35 P. 415 (Wash. 1893). Interestingly 
enough, it appears that courts have questioned more closely· 
the mayor's right to employ special counsel. See, ~' East 
St. Louis v. Thomas, 102 Ill. 453. (Ill.). 
V(B). Appellant and City Attorney Zollinger were disqualified 
and antagonistic to the Municipal Council 
Appellant Mayor was a member of the previous Logan 
City Commission which negotiated and authorized the exchange 
with Clair Bernston. Acting as Mayor, Appellant, actually 
effected the transfers to Mr. Bernston. Further, Appellant was 
an active participant in approving the transaction. T.R. 228 
et.~-
Appellant Mayor and City Attorney Zollinger were (and 
remain) in direct conflict with the majority of the Municipal 
Council concerning the gravamen of this Action. The Appellant 
stoutly defended his views regarding the power of his office and 
the City Attorney has supported that interpretation. Further-
more, they have actively carried out their duties in contra-
vention of the rules of law which this Complaint seeks to 
establish. 
The City Attorney Zollinger by his own admitted 
conflict of interest and public statements is disqualified. 
Transcript at 74. Under these circwnstc:.nces it is entirely 
proper for the Municipal Council to retain special counsel. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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~-Meeske v. Bauman, 241 ll. 1i"v'. 550 (lJeb.), ,~)J cl.• _!_J • • \ • 
131; Ireton v. State, 91 iJ.E. 1131. (Ohio). 
PGI:iT VI 
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ~!W ACT 3Y ORDI'.J.LUCS 02 RESOLUTIO:J' o;iu 
ORDINA!JCES BEHJG SUBJECT TO ;,IAYORAL VETO. 
[Including Responses to Bur~?nshaw/Baird ?oin~o III, IV, V.] 
Appellant does not contest the trial court's rulin~ 
with respect to this issue. However, laced throughout the 
Burtenshaw/Baird Brief are challenges to this ruling. Under 
the circumstances Respondent feels the issue should be laid 
before this Court. 
VI(A). The Municioal Council may act by resolution or ordina~' 
The original Section 10-6-116 in discussing the voti~ 
procedure of a municipal Council under the Optional Forms o! 
Municipal Government Act stated that every 
motion, resolution or ordinance shall be 
written and read before the vote is taken 
on it. 
(Emphasis added.) This section is now recodified at Section 
10-3-717. The obvious implication of such statutory language 
is that the Council could act by ordinance or resolution, 
depending on ·,vhetiie.c· it is e.1>.e~·-.:.i...;ir,g legislative or administr'· 
tive powers, respectively. 
VI(B). Only ordinances or aporopriation ordinances under tb_: 
Optional Forms of Municioal Government Act are subj~ 
to veto. 
Section lJ-3-1214 ·Jvides that the Mayor may veto 
"ordinances" or "appropriation ordinances." The ;.1ayor i::; 
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nowhere ~iven veto power over resolutions or motions of the 
Municipal rouncil. Incidentally it should be noted that 
Section 10-3-1214 giving this veto power over "ordinances" 
originally followed on the heel of original Section 10-6-116 
which providccd that the Municipal Council may act by "resolution 
or ordinance." These Utah statutes follow the general rule that 
the Mayor's veto is limited to ordinances adopted by the 
Municipal Council or matters having the character of an 
ordinance. 
The treatises indicate that 
the weight of authority limits the mayoral veto 
in the absence of clear provision to purely 
legislative matters. The veto is ordinarily 
not applicable to the internal functions of 
the local legislative body, nor to administerial 
or administrative matters. 
2A Antieau, § 4.37 at p. 4-71. 
Where the mayor is given power of approval or 
veto in general terms, it does not extend to 
matters which are not legislative in 
character . In the absence of a charter 
or statutory requirement, the resolution of 
the municipal council need not be signed or 
attested. 
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 359. 
VI(C). Resolutions are only appropriate for certain matters 
Utah law sets up certain mandatory procedures for the 
enactment of municipal ordinances. See Sections 10-3-701 
et. ~· These procedures are applicable to a city following 
the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. See Section 
10-3-1204. Section 10-3-711 requires the publication of 
ordinances. Resolutions, on the other hand, do not require 
publicatjon. Section 10-3-719. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Municipalities in Utah and elsewhere have developed 
customs about what is an appropriate matter for resolution and 
what is more properly handled by ordinance. In one shape or 
another three distinctions are generally made: first, ordii:a;,,,, 
are acts of legislation where a resolution is not; second, 
resolutions are used for matters temporary in nature, ordinanc:' 
represent a permanent rule; and third, resolutions are generali, 
used for matters administrative in nature. Indeed Section:; 
10-3-701 et. ~-, now establish these rules as law. 
An ordinance is distinguished from a resolution 
by the degree of formality required by its 
enactment. An ordinance provides permanent 
rules of government for conduct desired to 
affect matters arising subsequent to its 
adoption. A resolution deals with matters of 
a temporary or special nature, where the 
action taken generally involves findings 
of fact and may be characterized as administrative. 
2A Antieau § 4-14 at p. 4-30. Thus, resolutions are generally 
held appropriate Rhen they concern some matter of administrati~ 
and decide a particular matter. See, ~' Kalamazoo Municipa'. 
Utilities v. Kalamazoo, 76 NW 2d 1 (Mich.); Salisbury v. 
Nagel, 420 SW 2d 37 (Mo. App.), Baker v. Lake City Sewer 
Dist. 191 P 2d 844 (Wash. 1948). 
VI(D). The three resolutions passed by the Municipal Council 
regarding special counsel and litigation are effecti~· 
The first resolution which authorized retention of 
special counsel to investigate the gravel pit exchange dealt 
appropriately with an administrative matter. The action taken 
was as to one specific matter, had no general impact and was 
of a permanent nature. The second resolution retaining tllat 
special counsel and authorizing litigation, if necessary, wa 3 
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of like import. T.R. at 83. 
The thir1 resolution seeking to retain special counsel 
incident to this litigation was also specific, temporary and 
administrative. T.R. at 84. Quite obviously, these actions are 
not the type which should receive a section number and be 
placed in a book as ordinances of a city. They are enacted 
pursuant to the Municipal Council's control over the real 
property and finances of a ·city and its power to have its legal 
status determined. Within these resolutions, there is no 
determination affecting future conduct. 
POINT VII 
INDIVIDUAL COUNCILMEMBERS HAVE A FREE AND UNLIMITED RIGHT TO 
MUNICIPAL RECORDS. 
[Including Response to Appellant, Point V.] 
Appellant does not clearly indicate in their Point V 
whether they are appealing from the lower courts' ruling or in 
what way said ruling is urged by them to be erroneous. The 
lower court's complete ruling with respect to this issue was as 
follows: 
As to the Eighth cause of action, the testimony 
at the Evidentiary Hearing was conflicting as 
far as the evidence was concerned as to what 
the administration was supplying or not supply-
ing to the Council as far as information is 
concerned regarding city government. The Mayor, 
as defendant, claiming information has always 
been available but also admitting that he did 
apply a condition before providing the informa-
tion himself to the Council, that condition 
being a meeting between all department heads 
and the requesting Council chairman. 
As far as supplying information generally is 
concerned, the Court holds that the Council 
is entitled to any information that are records 
pertaining to the city and in custody of the 
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executive branch and that they may, by 
resolution or ordinance, set the policy by 
which they may obtain this information in 
a reasonable manner and provide and allocate 
funds for its assembly in the form that they 
feel will be most efficient and effective 
for t~eir use. a~i to ~iva direction to the 
executive branch as to their policy on 
obtaining the information by resolution or 
ordi~ance as lon~ as it does not make un-
reasonable demands especially involving the 
element of time for the accumulation of 
the information. 
Final Summary Declaratory Judgment, T.R. at 446-~47. [ ta%e:. 
verbatim from the trial court's Memorandum ~ecision, T.R. a~ 
405 J. 
Evidently Appellant wishes to have the Supreme Cour: 
find the Mayor did not deny Chairman Larsen information buc 
merely declined to himself assemble records. The trial court 
gave no evidenciar:/ findings as to whether there was or was no1 
such a denial. The trial court terminated the evidentiary 
process having found a justiciable issue and then proceeded 
to set forth what it found to be the law as to the information 
requests between the Council and Mayor. Transcript at 75-76. 
Evidently Appellant does not wish to contest the legal find~g 
by the trial court on this issue, making reference to the same 
as a "rather petty matter." Appellant's Brief at 32. In 
answer thereto Respondents can only note the futility of arg~~ 
over Appellant's mischaracteri zation of the facts if Appellanc 
is unwilling to appeal the legal finding. It is unusual to 
find a Brief challenging the trial court's fact finding which 
then acquiesces to the legal rule derived therefrom. 
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VII(:,). Appellant mistates the facts 
Respondent does challenge the facts as represented 
in Appellant's Brief. Respondent maintains that the Mayor 
did refuse acc2J2, granted access which was only conditional, 
and, finally, inaugurated a city policy intended to effectively 
control and limit information obtainable by Council Members. 
Appellant's own Brief filed in the District Court accurately 
states the position taken by Appellant with respect to informa-
tion requested by Council Members: 
As Plaintiff Darwin Larsen has repeatedly 
demonstrated, to whatever he turns his 
attention develops into a "controversy" 
which often is not really a controversy. 
This is the case with respect to his request 
for information. If there is an issue per-
haps the right of the City Administration to 
be free from undue interference from Munici~al 
Council Members as reflected in Section 10- -121 
U.C.A. 1953, is the real question. Must City 
Administration immediately furnish all materials 
requested by a Municipal Council member regard-
less of the amount of information requested, 
the amount of time given to obtain the informa-
tion, the relevancy of the material to legitimate 
Council business and the amount of time and 
money involved in seeking out, gathering, and 
copying the material? Access to public records 
(which no one disputes) is much different than 
repeated demands for substantial amounts of 
detailed material the purpose of which often 
appears to have no relation to council business 
and which not only disrupts City employee work-
loads, but has a demoralizing effect on all 
aspects of City administration. To set guide-
lines in an effort to minimize such adverse 
influences seems to be reasonable. 
T.R. 131-32 (emphasis added). Admittedly, with sophisticated 
counsel the issues raised have been predictably shifted and 
reshaped, Appellant would have the Court believe the issue was 
whether the Mayor must himself supply information. That was 
not the issue before the trial court, and Respondents have 
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never urged that the Mayor himself was required to deliVtoi' 
information. 
With respect to why Chairman Larsen directed his 
request to Mayor Anderson for certain documents it shoulcl be 
noted that there is a Logan ordinance requiring the sam 0 • 
Section 2-1-4, Logan Ordinances (1976), states that staff 
assistance to the Municipal Council is "to be furnished by tr.c 
Executive Branch through the chief executive officer." 1'hat 
is, if Chairman Larsen wanted copies of certain documents ra:''i 
than request it of the City Recorder, he would be required t8 ! 
direct such a request to the Mayor. In conjunction therewith 
the Mayor adopted a policy that no staff assistance or copies 
could be rendered to Council members except through his office. 
Transcript at 36. That quite adequately explains why the 
request was put to the Mayor rather than the custodian of the 
records. Furthermore, the suggestion that Chairman Larsen w~ 
in some fashion demeaning the Mayor by demanding he personally 
go copy the records, assemble and staple them is pure fiction 
and totally unsupported by any evidence in the record. 
It should also be noted that these voluminous 
requests which "demoralized" the entire city administration anc 
"disrupted" employee workloads were introduced as exhibits in 
the evidentiary hearing. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 
6. 
The only demoralizing or disruptive effect these 
requests producedwas that resulting from the disclosure of 
information as to the manner in which the Appellant was mi::-
conducting city business. That is, the requests did not 
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dehloralize or disrupt, but the public dissemination of the 
information may well have done so, for it revealed widespread 
violations of state and municipal law by the city administration. 
For example, unknown property transactions, interfund transfers, 
etc. 
was that 
Mr. Larsen's testimony with respect to his requests 
Mr. Zollinger [city attorney) said that I 
could have the information, if I was not 
going to make trouble with it. But he said 
that if I was going to make trouble with 
the information that I received that I would 
have to pay the cost of having the material 
assembled and the cost of reproducing. 
Transcript at 63 (emphasis added). The Court should note that 
Mr. Larsen was no mere citizen, but the elected Chairman of the 
Municipal Council requesting information with regard to city 
matters. 
The Logan City administration had imposed certain 
restrictions on information. The City Recorder's testimony 
at the evidentiary hearing was as follows: 
Q Now has the Mayor on any occasion ever 
announced to you and other department heads 
any policy concerning circumstances or 
conditions upon which information in your 
office will be furnished to anyone? 
A Yes. 
Q When was the policy announced, as best you 
recall? 
A I don't remember the dates. It was in one 
of our weekly department meetings. 
Q And do you remember about when it would have 
been? Would it have been around the first 
of this year, 1977? 
A I couldn't give you a date on it. 
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Q Well, would you just tell us what t:1:1t 
policy was that was announced, as best 
you recall ii;? 
A he just asked that information be clear~d 
through his office as a mana~ement tool, 
you l:no':1. 
Q And after that pe~·~a o~ time ~~en a re1uest 
came to you for information that was in 
your possession what did you do with those 
requests? 
A I accumulated ~hatever they requested and 
then gave it to the Mayor to clear through 
his office. 
Transcript at 53. The testimony is buttressed by that of Mr. 
Larsen and Appellant's own testimony. See Transcript at 27-
54-56, 59, 65, 71-72. 
The e~identiary hearing also showed quite clearly 
the placing of additional conditions on Mr. Larsen's access to 
information, to wit: that it would be provided him only on 
condition thai:; he attend certain staff meetings. In fact, 
Appellant indicates that it was collected by city emplo~,2~s 
but that he refused to deliver it until Chairman Larsen 
complied with his conditions. See Transcript at 29-37, 42, 60-i 
Appellant's characterization of this issue on appeal 
as being a "petty matter" together with its characterization 
in open court as a "tempest in a teapot" well indicates 
Appellant's attitude. Transcript at 72. Respondent urges this 
Court that the Trial Record and particularly the Transcript 
of the September 13th, 1977, Evidentiary Hearing, evidence a 
disturbing attempt to reduce and limit access to public 
information concerning city administration. This attempt is 
characterized by nebulous "policies," vague "conditions," 
and administrative questioning of what is proper informat i,~>1 1 
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for the Council members and what they intend to do with it. 
These requests for information and the administrative reaction 
to them did not occur in a vacuum but at a time when the Council 
pursuant to its duty, was legitimately questioning widespread 
conduct by the Mayor and his subordinates. The trial court 
later found, pursuant to the instant case, the conduct of 
Appellant was contrary to Utah municipal law. 
The trial court found evidence on this information 
issue conflicting, but because of the compelling and basic legal 
requirements regarding free and unlimited access to information 
was compelled to set out in detail the legal requirements. It 
might also be noted that Respondents did not present all their 
evidence on this issue as it was stipulated that sufficient 
evidence had been rendered to make the issue justiciable, thus 
finding the issue justiciable, the trial court gave its legal 
rule which Appellant does not dispute to this Court. Transcript 
at 75-76. Rather, Appellant now disputes the partial facts 
introduced. The legal ruling should now be reaffirmed. 
POINT VIII 
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT HEADS MAY TRANSFER ONLY UNENCUMBERED OR 
UNEXPENDED APPROPRIATIONS WITHIN A DEPARTMENT WITHOUT COUNCIL 
APPROVAL, UNENCUMBERED FUNDS BEING THOSE FUNDS NOT SET ASIDE 
FOR BUDGETED LINE ITEMS. 
[Including Response to Appellant Point IV.] 
Appellant's Point IV again mistates the issue before 
this Court. The trial court's Final Judgment clearly states 
that intra-departmental budgeting transfers may be made without 
the Council's consent or involvement. T.R. at 444. Neither 
Appellant nor Respondents have appealed that ruling. However, 
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the issue before this Court on Respondent's ninth claim for 
relief deals with whai; ad:r,inistra;:~ ;e r2.3p2ct must be? accorded 
line items in Logan's budbetary process. That is, are the 
city's ad~~nistrative departments free to reallocate monies 
from appropriated monies for a specified line item to an enti~ 
new item not stated in the budget. For example, can administr:. 
tive officers who have received budgetary approval for four au:., 
mobiles for the Street Department unilaterally cancel that 
appropriation and purchase a patrol on a conditional sales 
contract? That is the issue before this court. T.R. at 10. 
Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing where evidence 
was taken regarding Logan City practices, the issue was 
submitted to court by legal memorandums. Plaintiffs Memorandum, 
T.R. at 364-372, Defendant's Memorandum, T.R. at 399-401. 
The trial court thereupon rendered judgment on this 
issue holding that the administrative officials could not ent~ 
into conditional sales contracts without Municipal Council 
approval as they were installment debts, binding future opera-
tion of the Municipality. T.R. at 447. The Court further heN 
and reaffirmed that intradepartmental transfers of unencumbe~d 
and unexpended funds did not need Council approval. But in 
explaining that ruling the Court held funds budgeted for a 
specified line item were "encumbered." T.R. at 447. It is 
only from this last interpretation that Appellant has appealed 
in Point IV of his Brief. 
VIII(A). The general operation of the Uniform Municipal Pi~ 
Procedures Act provides oublic and Council input~ 
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i11~~ tud;ets ?~d pres~PTTes Council control over 
div~rsion of funds from snecified line items. 
The Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act closely 
details the law relating to fiscal procedures in Utah munici-
pali ties. It provides for tentativ2 budgets, public review and 
publication before final passage. There are requirements that 
detailed estimates of expenditures be submitted to the governing 
body. Section 10-10-33(5)(6). It requires the tentative budget 
with these detailed estimates shall be made public. Section 10-10-34 
The public is notified of a public hearing regarding the budget. 
Section 10-10-36. The plain import of these procedures is to 
allow both the governing body and citizenry to speak concerning 
the items in the budget, i.e. "we don't need two new police 
cars" or "we need three cars," etc. Section 10-10-37 provides 
that in adopting the final budget the governing body may "insert 
such new items or may increase or decrease such items of 
expenditure." 
After adoption of the budget, in relation to dealing 
with expenditure accounts and line items, there are restrictions 
upon the administrative officials: 
To implement the use of the encumbrances system 
he [the budget officer) shall cause separate 
accounts to be kept for the items of appropri-
ation contained in the budget of each fund, 
each of which shall show the amount of the 
appropriation, the amounts paid therefrom, 
the unpaid obligations against it and the 
unencumbered balance. No appropriation shall 
be encumbered and no expenditure shall be made 
for any item of appropriation unless there is 
a sufficient unencumbered balance of appropri-
ation and available funds for said item, 
except in cases of emergency as hereinafter 
provided. 
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10-10-43 (empha::;L added). 
With the consent of the budget officer, the he~J 
of any department may trans l'e1' any unencu:niJereu 
or unexpended appropriation balance or any 
portion thereof from one expenditure account to 
another within the department during the bud;e~ 
year, or an excess expe:1d.i ':-ure u..:_' ()_~~ ·=:-r., r:1s~ .~ 
line items may be permitted by any department 
head with the consent of the budget officer, 
provided the total of all excess expenditures 
or encumbrances de no~ exceed tctal unused 
appropriations within the department at the 
close of the budget year. 
10-10-46 (Emphasis added). These restrictions allow so8e 
flexibility; a department head with the consent of the bud;,; 
of:icer may shift surplus funds from one expenditure account 
to another. In addition, the department head, again with 
budget officer approval, may cause excess expenditure for a 
given line item. But nowhere are the department heads and 
budget officer given authority to appropriate funds• designa~e; 
for a particular line item, to a different purpose. That is, 
there is a recognition that there are miscellaneous funds and 
that some line items may be purchased with less than the set 
appropriation and thereby result in surplus funds. As to thcs' 
funds the department head and budget officer have a needed 
flexibility, they may shift them to a line item for which t~ 
appropriation was low or they may shift them to another expenci· 
ture account. For example, the funds could be shifted to 
police salaries so as to pay a cost overrun due to overtime 
incurred by police officers, etc. 
VIII(B). The Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act applies 
directly to Logan City 
Section 10-3-1204 of the Optional Forms of Municipa' 
Government Act provides that 
d 
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All existing statutes governing municipalities 
snall remain applicable except as provided in 
thi::; part. 
~urther~ore in Section 10-3-1219 (6) the Act further provides 
in delineatin~ the specific powers of the Mayor, that he shall 
[a]ppoint a budget officer for the purpose of 
conforming with the requirements of the uniform 
m~~~:i ~l fiscal procedures act and in all other 
respects fulfill the requirements of that act; 
By these statutes, the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act 
i3 made fully applicable to Logan City except as the Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act specifically provides other-
wise. Respondents further contend that the only significant 
change made by the Act is set forth in Section 10-3-1214. 
This statute provides participation by both the Municipal Council 
and Hayor in passing "appropriation ordinances" in that it allows 
the Mayor to veto an appropriation. 
VIII(C). Aopellant's theory would destroy the integrity of a 
participatory budget process. 
Appellant contends that once the final budget ordinance 
is passed that Municipal Council control, except as to interfund 
and interdepartmental transfers, is at an end. Furthe~ that 
the administrative officials of the city on their own authority 
may trasnfer any and all funds between accounts and line items. 
Respondents urge the Court that if this were the 
case, the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act procedures 
requiring notice, hearings, etc., are a mere facade, a public 
show, behind which, administrative officials determine actual 
expenditures. For example, after weighty consideration and public 
hearing the Council could decide the police department needs new 
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vehicles and create line items ~J~ their purchase. Were the 
Appellant's position adopted, the department head with the 
consent of the budget offic2r could without any other authorit; 
transfer funds from the employee allocation in his department 
I 
budget and purchase fifteen police cars. If Appellant's positi.J 
is correct the Municipal Council and citizenry should not 
bother discussing how many police cars are needed, a dollar 
sum should simply be allocated to each department. There is 
no control. Appellant's contention is that the "departmental 
grant" is the limit of the control which can lawfully be 
exerted by the Council. Quite obviousl~ the requirements of 
providing detailed estimates to the governing body, public 
hearings concerning the items of expenditure and a budget whi~ 
appropriates to these line i terns would be of no binding effect. 
The whole procedure under that interpretation is a mere facade. 
Respondents reject those arguments maintaining that 
fiscal procedures embody a set of legal controls, to wit: that 
the only appropriations which may be adminis tra ti ve ly realloc2te: 
are those which are earmarked miscellaneous or which are truly 
surplus. Further, that the Municipal Council, after proper 
citizen input, by adopting a budget with detailed line items 
legally binds administrative officials to use public funds for 
those purposes and none other. Of cours~ changes may be 
required and the Council is free to cause those changes in 
accordance with the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act. 
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VIII(D). Line items are a definable and significant part of 
the bud~etary control process. 
The budgets of Logan City in the past and presently 
show little relation to the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures 
Act. However, certain appropriatiO(l.> can be called "line items" 
for example: 
Item #251 2 patrols $90,000.00 
Item #252 3 pickup trucks 15,000.00 
2 - 1/2 ton trucks 
1 - 3/4 ton truck 
In the example above, it is clear that one line item is two 
patrols and the other line item is the three pickup trucks and 
that there is left considerable administrative discretion. 
Logan City's budget has no such clear designations. However, it 
does appear in the Logan City budget what general equipment 
type the appropriation was for and, under the present circum-
stances, it appears reasonable to consider a specific appropri-
ation for a particular equipment item as a line item. It should 
be noted that the legislative body by its use of the designation 
"Item" can control the amount of discretion left in administra-
tive officials. In the example given, supra, in "Item #252" 
each vehicle could be made a line item or the three trucks 
could be made one line item. In the example's wording it 
appears that administrative officials could order two 3/4 ton 
pickups and one 1/2 ton pickup rather than as specified therein. 
Nowhere, of course, is there authority or discretion given to 
buy four pickups under Item #251 appropriating money for patrols. 
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A Colorado case dealing with the purchase of vat 
machines supports Respondents' reasoning: 
It is undisputed that the budget items totaling 
$132,843 and the subsequent aopropriation of 
$132,800 was intended to provide payment for 
the items of contemplated expense specifically 
itemized in the commission's budget, none of 
which pertained in any respect to purchase of 
voting machines. Under charter provisions, after 
the budget is made, the several sums shall then 
be appropriated by ordinance "to the several 
purposes and departments therein named." 
True, the charter provides that, "The budget 
shall be prepared in such details as to the 
aggregate sum and the items thereof allowed 
to each department, office or commission as the 
council shall deem advisable subject to limita-
tions in this charter," and where, as in the case 
before us, a single appropriation is made cover-
ing the total of numerous items separately, but 
rather that the total expenditure for the amounts 
so budgeted together must not exceed the total 
of the appropriation therefor, and that the 
money appropriated to that class can be used 
for no other purpose except the items in the 
budget for which the appropriation was made. In 
the case before us, either the appropriations 
must be held void as being without a specified 
purpose, or they must be construed as being for 
the purposes specified in the budget upon which 
the appropriations are, and must be based. The 
payment of $7,050 as authorized by the city under 
the ordinance and contract for purchase of the 
Shoup machines could not by any contortion be 
fitted into any o~ the purposes specified in 
those budgeted items 
Under the provisions of the Denver charter, 
appropriation items must be tied to the budget; 
payments of city funds must be restricted to 
the purposes for which they were appropriated 
and budgeted, and any contract for payment 
during the year 1951 not so appropriated and 
budgeted for that year and not caused by any 
casu~l~y, accident or unfore~een conti~~ency 
after ~he pa~-~~e of the 3~n~~: appropriation 
ordinanc , a~ groviJe~ in Sectic~ 3J4 of the 
charter, mLG t be heJd v0id. 
Kingsley v. City and County of Denver, ?1 1 - •• J. C'~'J, >_c.-1"'< 
(Colo. 1952). 
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Under Logan City's present budget practices it 
appears appropriate to consider each item for which a money 
v2lu~ is tied to a specified purpose to be a line item and 
exce~~ for some abevations this appears workable. One abera-
tion is that each worker's salary is specified, it appears 
recsonable in the case of, for example, firemen salaries to 
regard the salary total as the line item rather than the 
specified amount for each particular individual. 
The testimony of Logan Budget Officer, Duane Beck 
indicated that, in general, the interpretation presented herein 
corresponds with his opinion of what a line item is. Transcript 
at 92-93. However, Mr. Beck indicated line item treatment was 
not considered binding on administrative officials. Transcript 
at 95-96. Further, that the city administration had in fact 
purchased a very expensive patrol for the city on a conditional 
sales contract and out of Class C road funds not appropriated 
by the Municipal Court for such a purchase. Transcript at 
100-105. Respondents urge that line item treatment for such 
a purchase is required. 
VIII(E). General law requires specific appropriations by 
le~islative bodies. 
In dealing with budgets and appropriations there are 
numerous references to the need for specificity so as to allow 
citizen review and discussion of the application of tax monies. 
A taxpayer has the right to have the purpose 
of an appropriation stated in sufficiently 
clear and intelligble manner, so that he 
can understand, from it, what it is for, and 
so that he may have a basis for determining 
prioritJ. 
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Application of Cook County, 304 N.E. 2d 46, 48 (Ill. 1970). 
The only logical interpretation of this 
provision [restricting expenditures to 
amounts appropriated, compare C.R.S. 1963, 
88-1-14 vii th its Utali equivalents § § 10-10-39, 
45] is that since there is an absolute 
prohibition a0ainst spending in excess of an 
appropriation, there can be no sum spent when 
there is no appropriation. While application 
of this statute to the facts in the instant 
case may have harsh results, the statute is, 
nevertheless, binding upon us. Its purpose 
is to protect the taxpayer against improvident 
use of tax revenue, to encourage citizen 
participation and debate prior to the 
institution of public orojects, to insure 
public disclosure of proposed spenaing, and 
to encourage prudence and thrift by those 
elected to direct expenditure of public funds. 
Accordingly, it, in conjunction with certain 
other provisions of the budget law, requires 
that certain formalities, such as public 
hearings and formal adoption of budgets, be 
complied with before public funds can be spent. 
Shannon Water Dist. v. Norris Drilling Co., 477 P2d, 478 (Colo. 
1970) (emphasis added). 
Isn't the purpose of the budget law to require 
that all proposed expenditures be itemized and 
published for the scrutiny of the public, to 
the end that every constituent of the govern-
ing body may examine the items of anticipated 
expenditures? We think that is a fairly good 
analysis of its purpose, or one of them at 
least. 
Washington Twp. v. Hart, 215 P2d 180, 181 (Wash. 1950). 
The position of Appellant is that by law the public 
has no legal ground for input or control over the budget as 
within departments, and further, that Logan's governing body, 
the Municipal Council, also has no power over the budget once 
it is initially appropriated. 
Respondents maintain that except for such authority, 
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officials by the Fiscal ?rocedures Act there is no administra-
tive authority to juggle line items or appropriations. 
An appropriation of public funds is a setting 
apart from public revenue of a certain sum of 
money for a specified purpose in such a manner 
that the executive officers of the government 
are authorized to use that money a~d no more 
for the purpose specified and no other. 
State v. Moore, 69 N.W. 373 
In specific terms, an appropriation may be 
defined as an authority of the legislative, 
given at the proper time and in legal form 
to the proper officers to apply a distinctly 
specified sum from a designated fund out of 
the treasury in a given year, for a specified 
object or demand against the state. 
63 Am Jur 2d, Public Funds § 46 (footnotes omitted). 
The power of the legislature with respect to 
the public funds raised by general taxation 
is supreme, and no state official, from the 
highest to the lowest, has any power to 
create an obligation of the state, either 
legal or moral, unless there has first been 
a specific appropriation of funds to meet 
the obligation. 
42 Am Jur, Public Funds 42 (footnotes omitted). 
The object of such provisions is to prohibit 
expenditures of public funds at the mere 
will and caprice of those having the funds 
in custody, without direct legislative 
sanction therefor. 
63 Am Jur 2d, Public Funds § 45 (footnotes omitted). 
Respondents urge that they, as the Municipal Council, 
possess plenary budget control over the administrative 
officials of Logan City. And further, that under applicable 
state law their designation of appropriations for certain line 
items is binding on administrative officials. Respondents urge 
that the purchase of large scale equipment customarily accorded 
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therefore is contrary to the Uniform Municipal Fiscal 
Procedures Act. The citizens of Logan City and their elected 
officials have been deprived by the present budgetary operatic~ 
of their legal right to notice and participation in the alloc 2-
tion of c~eir tax monies. An old Massachusetts case sums up 
Respondents' positio~: 
As has been held repeatedly the design of 
the budget law for cities was to set rigid 
barriers against expenditures in excess of 
appropriation, to cultivate municipal thrift, 
to prevent the borrowing of money for current 
expenses and in general to put cities upon 
a sound financial basis so far as those ends 
can be achieved by legislation. (Citing 
cases). It would strongly tend to frustrate 
this design if the juggling with appropriations 
already made, such as thus disclosed, were 
upheld. 
Burt v. Municipal Council, 176 N.E. 511, 513 (Mass.). 
CONCLUSION i 
Respondents urge th2t the trial court's opinion shouii' 
be reaffirmed in its e~~irety by this Court. The powers oft~ 
Municipal Council vis-a-vis the Mayor are determined under 
state law. The only reasonable interpretation of the laws 
governing 
governing 
Logan City is that the Council possesses the municipa: 
powers except as those powers are specifically I 
enumerated and given the Mayor by the Optional Forms of Munic~~ 
Government Act. 
Respondents initially sought a court determination 
of their powers and duties so that they could properly 
represent, in their elected positions, the citizens of Logan 
. I 
City. Respondents now ask the Supreme Court to delineate tJ1occ 1 
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respo11sibilities for the benefit of the citizens of Logan city 
and to thereby assist present and future elected officials to 
adequately perform their duties and responsibilities. 
Respectfully submitted 
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